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Abstract
Essays on Fiscal and Macro-prudential Policies with Credit Market Frictions:
Theory and Empirics
Sofia Kalantzi
This dissertation focuses on how fiscal, and macro-prudential policies interact
with financial market frictions. In particular, it addresses some of the key
facts of the recent global financial crisis and provides an intuition of why
different policies were implemented by many countries in order to mitigate the
adverse effects of the financial crisis and how those policies are transmitted
in the presence of financial market imperfections. This dissertation opens the
discussion of the different welfare implications of alternative policies that seek
to stabilize the economy as well as their different real effects in the economy.
The dissertation consists of three main chapters. In the first chapter I
document empirically a negative relationship between shocks to government
spending and credit spreads. Using a SVAR methodology on US data, I show
that after a positive shock to government spending, credit spreads drop up
to 14 basis points. The analysis shows that it is in particular government
investment that has a negative effect on the spreads as opposed to government
consumption.
Given this empirical evidence, in the second chapter, I examine the interac-
tion between productivity-enhancing government spending and credit spreads.
In the context of a costly state verification framework, increased borrowing to
viii
expand production increases the threshold productivity level below which firms
choose to default, and thus, entails higher risk premium. However, when gov-
ernment spending contributes to aggregate production, the threshold level of
default and, thus, the probability of default, decrease, leading to a lower risk
premium.
In the last chapter I address two main questions: how does the economy
respond in a crisis experiment when credit frictions originate from both the
supply-side and the demand-side of credit markets? How are alternative un-
conventional credit policies different in their real effects in an environment
where both types of credit frictions are present? I show that higher aggre-
gate risk results in increased leverage for both firms and financial intermedi-
aries, leading to an endogenous amplification mechanism which appears much
stronger than what predicted by the benchmark financial accelerator frame-
work. Furthermore, I find that, following a severe recession, a credit policy
entailing equity injections into the banking system performs better than one
involving direct lending to non-financial firms.

1Chapter 1: Credit spreads and risk premia: an empirical analysis
1.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has given a renewed interest on the effectiveness
of fiscal policy as a countercyclical tool in the presence of credit frictions.
During this period credit spreads increased significantly in many countries,
for example the spreads in the Euro zone have increased by 200 basis points,
while they have increased even more in the U.S.. Since monetary policy was
not effective in many cases, for example the policy interest rate had reached
the zero lower bound in the U.S., it was clear that fiscal policy was a dimension
along which governments could do more. In fact many countries had relied
on fiscal stimulus packages to help their economies recover from the crisis.
For example, the US Congress passed in 2008 a fiscal stimulus package of 800
billion dollars. Two thirds of the package consisted of increases in government
spending and transfers, while the rest was covered by tax cuts. The purpose
of this package was to speed up recovery and increase output. Several other
fiscal stimulus packages followed after that.
There has been an extensive analysis in the existing literature of the role
of fiscal policy. However, the greatest part of the literature has examined the
effects of fiscal policy in a context of perfect financial markets. For example,
2Baxter and King (1993) in a neoclassical model where prices are flexible and all
goods and factor markets are perfectly competitive, show that an increase in
government spending financed only through lump-sum taxes, leads to a strong
negative wealth effect which reduces consumption and leisure, and, thus, the
interest rate. As a consequence the marginal product of capital increases and
stimulates capital accumulation which is accommodated by the drop in interest
rate. However, when financial markets are considered incomplete, this is no
longer the case because investment is not risk-free and there is a wedge between
the risk-free rate and the marginal product of capital, even in the absence of
monopolistic competition.
In a model with price rigidities, as shown by Linnemann and Schabert
(2003), monopolistically competitive firms meet the extra demand caused by
a government spending shock by increasing the supply of output; however,
output can only expand to the extent that inflation adjusts.
When financial rigidities are present the expansion of output depends also
on the degree at which firms are credit constrained and their ability to gain
access to external finance and increase output.
On the other hand, even when fiscal policy is examined in the presence
of financial frictions, government spending has been treated as “wasteful” re-
sources. For example, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde (2010), examines what are the
effects of fiscal policy in the presence of financial frictions in a DSGE model
featuring the financial accelerator type of story. In that case, the only way
through which an increase in government spending can reduce the finance pre-
mium is through increasing inflation. In other words, a shock to government
3spending increases demand, output expands, and inflation rises. Following this
effect, the wealth of entrepreneurs increases and reduces the external finance
premium.
Similarly, the main focus of the empirical literature has been the magnitude
of the fiscal multiplier with little emphasis given to the presence of the credit
channel. For example, using military spending as a proxy for government
spending Barro and Redlick (2011) estimate that the range of the multiplier is
between 0.6 and 1. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) use a SVAR and Choleski de-
composition to estimate a multiplier of 0.9 or 1.29, when different detrending
methods are applied. Mountforld and Uhlig (2009), by imposing sign restric-
tions on the impulse response functions and an orthogonality assumption of
fiscal variables to a general business cycle shock to identify fiscal shocks, esti-
mate a multiplier of 0.65. Following the methodology of Blanchard and Perotti
(2002), Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Vegh (2013) use a SVAR analysis on a quar-
terly dataset for 44 countries to estimate the impact and cumulative multiplier
by including a larger range of dependent variables. Moreover, Kraay (2012)
identifies fiscal shocks by using evidence from World Bank lending history. A
part of government spending is considered to be uncorrelated with the state
of the economy because it refers to projects that are affected by “changes in
World Bank project approval decisions made in previous years” as it is men-
tioned in the paper. Moreover, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko rely on a SVAR
that incorporates Ramey news to estimate multiplier ranges from -0.3 to 0.8
in expansions and from 1.0 to 3.6 in recessions. Moreover, Ramey and Shapiro
(1998), try to disentangle the exogenous unanticipated component of fiscal
4policy changes by including dummy variables to identify expansionary defense
spending which can be interpreted as exogenous and unforeseen changes in
fiscal policy.
I address those issues and fill the gap in the existing literature by examining
the effect that government spending has as a countercyclical tool on credit
spreads, and how the fiscal multiplier is affected as soon as we account for the
credit channel.
The contribution of this paper is twofold: first, from a theoretical point of
view the paper fills the gap in the literature by providing an empirical evidence
of the effects of government spending on credit spreads. Second, from a policy
perspective it provides a better understanding on why fiscal stimulus packages
have been used by many countries, and whether fiscal policy can be used as a
countercyclical tool during a period of financial distress.
In order to address the aforementioned issues, I employ a SVAR along the
lines of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) of aggregate US data to empirically inves-
tigate the effect of an exogenous government spending shock on credit spreads.
Doing so, I arrive to three main findings: first, both short-term and long-term
spreads fall after an exogenous increase in government spending. Second, it is
productive government investment (as opposed to government consumption)
that creases the link between government spending and spreads. Third, ac-
counting for credit spreads has important implications for the magnitude of
fiscal multipliers.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way: in the second section
I discuss the empirical methodology and in the third section details about the
5data. In the fourth section I present the main results and concluding remarks
are presented in the last section of this paper.
1.2 Empirical Methodology
This section describes the methodology followed to estimate the effects in the
main economic variables of a government spending shock.
There are many methodological approaches followed in the empirical lit-
erature in order to identify an exogenous government spending shock. The
main methodologies are the structural vector autoregressive method (SVAR)
proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), the one proposed by Barro (1984)
that employs military spending as a proxy for exogenous changes in govern-
ment spending, and the dummy variable approach suggested by Ramey and
Shapiro (1998).
I follow the methodology suggested by Blachard and Perotti (2002) which is
adopted extensively by the existing empirical literature. There has been some
debate on whether this methodology fails to consider anticipation effects (see
for example the critique by Ramey (2011) who advocates instead the narrative
approach that uses dummy variables to identify exogenous changes in govern-
ment spending). However, Mertens and Ravn (2012) show that anticipation
effects do not alternate the key findings of the SVAR approach.
The starting point of the analysis is the estimation of the following reduced
form VAR:
Xt = a+ bt+ ct
2 + Γ(L)Xt−1 +
3∑
i=1
γiDi,t + ut (1.1)
6where Xt ≡ [Gt Tt St Yt Πt]′ is the vector of the endogenous variables. In
particular Gt is the logarithm of real per capita government spending, Tt is
the logarithm of real per capita net taxes (net of transfer payments), St is
the spread which in the benchmark specification is defined as the difference
between the bank prime loan rate and the Treasury bill rate, Yt is the logarithm
of real per capita GDP, and Πt is inflation. Moreover, the above VAR includes
a trend polynomial of second order and a set of quarterly dummies, Di,t, that
control for seasonality in the data. The optimal number of lags included in
the lag polynomial Γ(L), according to both the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) and the Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) is four lags. In the above
specification, ut ≡ [ugt utt ust uyt upit ]′ is the vector of the reduced form residuals
that are allowed to be contemporaneously correlated.
In order to identify truly exogenous shocks to government spending I make
the assumption that the reduced form-estimated residuals from the above VAR
can be expressed as a linear combination of the structural shocks and the
remaining reduced form-estimated residuals in the following way:
ugt = agsu
s
t + agyu
y
t + agpiu
pi
t + β1e
t
t + e
g
t (1.2)
utt = atsu
s
t + atyu
y
t + atpiu
pi
t + β2e
g
t + e
t
t (1.3)
ust = asgu
g
t + astu
t
t + asyu
y
t + e
s
t (1.4)
uyt = aygu
g
t + aytu
t
t + aysu
s
t + e
y
t (1.5)
upit = apigu
g
t + apitu
t
t + apiyu
y
t + e
pi
t (1.6)
7where et ≡ [egt ett est eyt epit ]′ are the structural shocks with mean zero and Eete′s =
Σe, t = s.
In the above system of equations, the first two policy equations have been
ordered in a way that government spending comes first and then come net
taxes. However, the results do not change when alternative variable orderings
are considered.
Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2007), the two fiscal
reduced form-estimated residuals in the policy equations are functions of the
following components: the first component is the structural policy shocks, egt
and ett, which are the exogenous shocks one is interested in when estimating
the impulse response functions. The second component is the automatic re-
sponse of government spending and net taxes to changes in output, spreads,
and inflation. The last component is the systematic discretionary response of
government spending and net taxes to output, spread, and inflation. Both the
second and the third components are captured by the coefficients of the output,
spread, and inflation reduced-form disturbances in the first two equations.
The important underlying assumption, in order to identify the exogenous
government spending shock, is that, due to quarterly data, one can follow
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and assume that a shock to GDP cannot affect
government spending within a quarter. This assumption is essential for iden-
tifying fiscal shocks. Moreover, due to quarterly data and the absence of the
systematic response, government spending and net taxes are not affected by
unexpected movements of the spread within a quarter. In addition to that,
net taxes do not include any interest rate payments and, thus, changes in the
8spread have no effect on the response of taxes. Therefore, the coefficients of
the two policy-residuals, agy and aty, correspond only to an automatic response
of government spending and net taxes to changes in output. Moreover, the
coefficient agy is equal to zero since there is no automatic response of govern-
ment spending to output innovations within a quarter, while the coefficient
aty is the output elasticity of net taxes. This coefficient differs from zero since
changes in output automatically induce a change in the tax base. Furthermore,
due to the empirical specification according to which all variables included in
the VAR are in logarithmic form, the coefficients ags, ats, agpi, atpi, aty, agy,
represent elasticity estimates; for example, aty is the output elasticity of net
taxes. Perotti (2007) provides estimates of those elasticities covering the same
period as the present study, which can be summarized in the following table:
parameter elasticity
ags = ats 0
agpi -0.5
atpi 1.4
aty 1.97
agy 0
Imposing those restrictions on the system of equations 2-6, generates the fol-
lowing system:
ugt = −0.5upit + β1ett + egt (1.7)
utt = 1.97u
y
t + 1.4u
pi
t + β2e
g
t + e
t
t (1.8)
9ust = asgu
g
t + astu
t
t + asyu
y
t + e
s
t (1.9)
uyt = aygu
g
t + aytu
t
t + aysu
s
t + e
y
t (1.10)
upit = apigu
g
t + apitu
t
t + apiyu
y
t + e
pi
t (1.11)
Or in a more compact way:
Aut = Bet ⇒ ut = A−1Bet (1.12)
The ordering of the variables in the above system embodies two key iden-
tifying assumptions. First, government spending is ordered first. However,
the results do not change when alternative variable orderings are considered,
for example when net taxes are ordered first and then government spending.
Second, it is assumed that output and spread are jointly determined.
I follow the methodology proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) in
order to obtain the cyclically-adjusted government spending and net taxes,
(ugt and u
t
t− 1.97uyt − 1.4upit ), from the policy equations, which can be used as
instruments in the following equations.
What the above system captures is that an unexpected shock to govern-
ment spending, egt , in equation 1.7, has a contemporaneous effect to both real
GDP captured by the ugt coefficient on equation 1.10 and at the same time
an effect on spread, captured by the coefficient ugt in equation 1.9 but it is
affected only by their lagged values.
Estimating the coefficients in the above system of equations allows rep-
resenting the VAR as a MA process, used to estimate the impulse response
10
functions:
Xt = µ+
∞∑
i=0
Γi1A
−1Bet−i (1.13)
1.3 Data
The data set spans the period from the first quarter of 1980 to the fourth
quarter of 2007, without including the recent financial crisis as the purpose is
to examine the effect of an exogenous government spending shock when there
are no other factors affecting the main macroeconomic variables. Moreover,
extending the analysis to include the post-crisis period would generate serious
endogeneity issues since one could argue that during this period government
spending and spreads are jointly contemporaneously determined. The main
source of the data are the NIPA tables of the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
All data are quarterly time series.
Government spending is defined as the sum of government consumption
and gross investment. Taxes are defined as current receipts minus the sum of
current transfer payments, interest payments, and subsidies. A key feature of
these data is that both government spending and net taxes exclude interest
payments and receipts. Moreover, all variables, apart from the spread and
inflation, are made real after dividing by the GDP deflator, and per capita
after dividing by the civilian non-institutional population.
There are different definitions of the spread used in this empirical estima-
tion. The benchmark definition refers to the difference between the bank prime
loan rate and the Treasury bill rate. Apart from this extensively used in the
11
literature definition of the spread, I present the estimated impulse response
functions for the case where the spread is defined as the net interest margin of
banks. The key feature of this variation of the spread is that it is the ex post
spread that banks receive after correcting for default. The inclusion of this
type of spread is crucial for the analysis that follows in the description of the
theoretical model and the suggested channel through which and expansionary
fiscal policy can affect the credit market conditions. The last specification of
the spread that is considered is the difference between the Baa-rated corporate
bond yield and the long-term government bond yield. This is a spread that
corresponds to long term interest rates and its importance emerges from the
fact that it will allow for a robustness check of the benchmark results for the
case where the long run effects of government spending increases are consid-
ered. All the data for the interest rates are from the Federal Reserve Bank of
Saint Louis.
All series were tested for the presence of unit root processes. I adopted
the methodology proposed by Dolado, Jenkinson, and Sovilla-Rivero (1990)
to decide whether the series are trend stationary or not. However, due to the
mixed results of the tests, I estimated the model assuming both a deterministic
trend for all variables and then a stochastic trend. In both specifications the
results are the same.
1.4 Results
Figure 1 shows the impulse response functions of the main variables when
there is a shock to government spending by 1%, and the spread is defined as
12
the difference between the bank prime loan and the three months treasury bill
rate. The figure also displays the impulse response functions that Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) derive, extending their results to cover the same time period
as the present paper and in order to point out the changes in the responses
of the main variables due to the accounting for the credit channel in the es-
timations. The results suggest that an increase in government spending leads
to a decrease in the spread that will last for several quarters before return-
ing to the long run equilibrium. Due to this negative relationship, there is a
stronger response of output than in the case were the credit channel is absent,
verifying the important role of the financial accelerator mechanism in the US
economy. In other words, those results suggest that there is an important
effect of government spending on the spread that was previously ignored.
More specifically, after a 1% shock to government spending, the spread de-
creases by seven basis points on impact. The spread drops by up to fourteen
basis points in the second quarter and remains negative for several quarters
after the initial shock before returning to the long run trend. The countercycli-
cal nature of the spread is well established in the literature and it is something
that emerges from the exercise performed in this paper as well. Following the
negative effect on the spread, output increases more in comparison to the case
where the credit channel is not accounted for, and at the same time follows a
more persistent time path as it takes more quarters to return to the long-run
equilibrium.
The presence of the credit spread has an important effect on the estimated
fiscal multiplier as well. Figure 2 shows that the presence of the credit spread
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in the empirical model considered here, can lead to a higher fiscal multiplier
than the one suggested by the paper by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Those
results highlight that when estimating the fiscal multiplier considering the
presence of risk premia may alter the existing results.
The cumulative responses presented in figure 3 show that when the spread
is included in the estimations the response of the real GDP remains higher
even twelve quarters after the initial change in government spending than it
does in the case of Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
In figure 4 instead of the difference between the bank prime loan rate
and the three - months treasury bill rate, I consider the spread between a
bank’s interest earnings and expenses as a percent of interest - earning assets.
This difference is known in the literature as the net interest margin (nim).
Those rates depend on the actual income that banks receive after accounting
for defaulted loans. The results show that after a positive 1% increase in
government spending the nim decreases slightly. The response of the nim to
an increase in government spending is smaller than the response of the baseline
spread since the nim drops only after three quarters by one basis point and it
drops at most up to two basis points. After a government spending shock, both
the responses of the real GDP and government spending are more persistent
in comparison to the simpler case considered by Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
Moreover, in figure 5 I estimate the impulse response functions using the
difference between the yield of an index of seasoned long - term Baa - rated
corporate bonds and the yield on the constant maturity 10 - year treasury
note. This is a standard long - run maturity spread that has been proved to
14
have a strong predictive power of the economic performance at longer forecast
horizons. In figure 5 we see that by performing the same exercise as before,
a positive shock to government spending does not only affect short - term
spreads but it has an effect on this longer -term credit spread as well.
In figures 6 and 7 I examine separately the effect of a shock to government
investment on the spread and a shock to government consumption on the
spread. Traditionally, government spending has been treated as “wasteful” in
the theoretical macroeconomic literature. This stark view has been modified
somewhat in recent years, and especially after the recent financial crisis. How-
ever, the way by which such spending can affect the economy is still unclear.
In order to estimate the effect of the productive part of government spending
on credit spreads I perform a similar exercise as in the previous section by
including the two variables of government spending in the baseline system.
Figure 6 presents the impulse response functions of the main variables of
interest following a 1% increase in government investment. The results show
that after the shock the drop in the baseline spread i.e., the difference between
the bank prime loan and the treasury bill rate, is larger than in the previous
cases. On impact the spread falls by four basis points before returning to
the long run trend several quarters later. This result is very important since
it shows that the effect of government spending on credit spreads is not a
homogenous for different types of public spending. If one focuses only on the
aggregate government spending, important information is lost. In particular,
this result suggests that the effect that an expansionary fiscal policy can have
on the credit conditions is magnified if there is a strong interaction between
15
the public and private sectors in the economy. This view is considered in the
model economy that is suggested in the following section.
On the contrary, a shock to government consumption, as shown in figure
7, has opposite effects. When government spending is just “wasteful” then
the spread increases following an increase in government consumption. As a
result, and taking into account the effects of government investment in credit
spreads, the impulse responses of the credit spread in this case justifies the
prediction that only a specific part of government spending is responsible for
this negative effect that we observe in aggregate government spending on credit
spreads.
Moreover, we see from both figures that the response of government invest-
ment to a shock to government consumption is negligible. On the contrary,
the response of government consumption to government investment is large
and becomes similar in the ling run to the response of government investment
to its own shock. Those results are similar to Perotti 2004.
Those results suggest that only when there is a productive role of fiscal
policy it can alleviate the degree of financial frictions in the economy. Notice
that the results that an expansion of public consumption generates negative
multipliers are consistent with the results provided by Auerbach and Gorod-
bichenko (2010). Also, Mendoza et al (2013) present negative effects on output
of public consumption increases. Moreover, those results shed some light to
the direction that future research should follow. There are important impli-
cations for the private sector when the government decides to intervene in the
market, implications that have not been fully explored.
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1.5 Conclusion
In this paper I have studied the effect of government spending on different
credit spreads. I have shown that positive shocks to government spending
have a negative effect on the spread. Moreover, this result is robust for spreads
corresponding to both short-term and long-term securities. Furthermore, the
results show that when the credit spread in accounted for in the empirical
specification, the fiscal multiplier becomes larger than the one previously doc-
umented in the existing literature. Importantly, I show that public investment
is mainly driving this negative relationship between public spending and credit
spreads.
This paper opens the discussion about the importance of the credit channel
in accounting the effects of fiscal policy, and in particular government spending.
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Chapter 2: Productive government spending and risk premia
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to understand the effect of exogenous government
spending shocks on credit spreads. To this end, I provide theoretical evidence
that when government spending is not considered as wasteful resources, it
alleviates the cost of external financing.
During the recent financial crisis, credit spreads significantly increased in-
ternationally, justifying the empirical evidence that credit spreads widen dur-
ing downturns (Aliaga-Dı´az and Olivero (2010a) and (2010b)). Given the fact
that in many cases the policy rate has reached the zero lower bound and that
for several countries, like for example the countries in the Euro-zone, monetary
policy in not active, many countries relied on fiscal-stimulus policies in order
to overcome the recent recession. Those policies have revealed the role of fiscal
policy as a countercyclical instrument to stabilize the economy.
For example, Germany and the UK injected 50 billion Euros and 50 billion
pounds respectively, into their banks. Sweden, France, and Iceland followed
similar strategies. In the US the Congress accepted a capital injection package
to the Ford, GM, car industries to save them from bankruptcy. Additionally,
the Congress passed in 2009 a fiscal stimulus package, the American Recovery
18
and Reinvestment Act1 of 787 billions. Two thirds of the package consisted
of increases in government spending and transfers, while the rest was covered
by tax cuts. The purpose of this package was to speed up recovery and in-
crease output. However, it is hard to find a justification of the effect that the
implementation of those fiscal stimulus packages could have on credit market
conditions.
There are many studies that examine the role of credit market conditions on
the amplification of the business cycles. The pioneering works of Bernanke and
Gertler (1989), and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (BGG) (1996)0 emphasize
the financial accelerator effect of countercyclical credit spreads. In particu-
lar, they provide theoretical evidence of the amplification effect of aggregate
shocks due to the external finance premium resulting from endogenously aris-
ing agency costs. Moreover, the empirical literature (Aliaga-Dı´az and Olivero
(2010)) provide evidence that lending relationships and the hold-up effect be-
tween banks and borrowers are responsible for countercyclical credit spreads
that play a financial accelerator role in the propagation of technological shocks.
Moreover, the importance of the lending relationships has been emphasized
in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Monetary policy has been
considered as the main tool to stabilize both prices and output and that any
other tool plays only a minor role in stabilizing the economy (Blanchard et
al. (2010)). On top of that, the literature has emphasized the role of the cost
channel in linking the behavior of inflation to that of interest rates (Christiano
et all (2002), Ravenna and Walsh (2006), Airaudo and Olivero (2014)), in an
1The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act will hereafter be referred to as ARRA
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effort to examine the implications of lending relationships for monetary policy-
making. However, this literature does not consider the role of the risk premium
as it assumes a zero-probability of default.
On the other hand, little is known regarding the transmission mechanism
of fiscal policy in the presence of credit market imperfections. On top of that,
there is no unanimity regarding the effects of fiscal policy in the business cycle
literature. In particular, the effects of government spending on private activity
are still a matter of debate.
There is a strand of theoretical literature that supports the view that posi-
tive government spending shocks lead to higher incentives to work and save in
order to offset the negative effect on households wealth. For example Baxter
and King (1993), Cambell (1994), and Linnemann and Schabert (2003) sup-
port the view of a strong negative wealth effect resulting from an increase in
government demand. The strong presence of this effect leads to an increase in
employment but a decrease in private consumption and wages. However, those
papers treat government spending as wasted resources instead of proposing a
model that emphasizes the important role of public capital injections in infras-
tructure, innovative technology, education, job creation and job education, as
well as the key role of public services.
On the other hand, an increase in private consumption after a positive
shock in government was supported by papers that consider productive gov-
ernment spending, e.g., Linnemann and Schabert (2006). This assumption is
not new in the literature since Barro (1990), first introduced public capital
stock in the production function in an endogenous growth model. Ever since,
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many papers have examined the effects of the presence of public capital stock
in the production function, such as Turnovsky (2000), Ghosh and Mourmouras
(2004). More recently Leeper, Walker and Yang (2010), and Trabandt (2006)
have shown that the introduction of public capital in the production leads
to higher welfare gains. However, these papers examine fiscal policy in the
context of frictionless financial markets. It is important, therefore, to take
into consideration the presence of frictions in the market since both theory
and empirics support their significant role in affecting the dynamics in the
economy.
Additionally, the empirical literature provides evidence that exogenous gov-
ernment spending shocks appear to lead to a positive temporary response of
private consumption, employment, and wages (Blanchard and Perotti (2002),
Fatas and Mihov (2002) Gali et al. (2004)). Furthermore, the empirical lit-
erature has provided a range of the estimated fiscal multiplier. For example,
using military spending as a proxy for government spending Barro and Redlick
(2011) estimate that the range of the multiplier is between 0.6 and 1. Blan-
chard and Perotti (2002) use a SVAR and Choleski decomposition to estimate
a multiplier of 0.9 or 1.29, when different detrended methods are applied.
Mountforld and Uhlig (2009), by imposing sign restrictions on the impulse
response functions and an orthogonality assumption of fiscal variables to a
general business cycle shock to identify fiscal shocks, estimate a multiplier of
0.65. Following the methodology of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Ilzetzki,
Mendoza and Vegh (2013) use a SVAR analysis on a quarterly dataset for
44 countries to estimate the impact and cumulative multiplier by including
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a larger range of dependent variables. Moreover, Kraay (2012) identifies fis-
cal shocks by using evidence from World Bank lending history. A part of
government spending is considered to be uncorrelated with the state of the
economy because it refers to projects that are affected by “changes in World
Bank project approval decisions made in previous years” as it is mentioned
in the paper. Moreover, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko rely on a SVAR that
incorporates Ramey news to estimate multiplier ranges from -0.3 to 0.8 in
expansions and from 1.0 to 3.6 in recessions. It is evident from the existing
literature, however, that despite the vast estimates of the multiplier, i.e. the
magnitude of the effects of fiscal policy on output, little attention has been
given to the channels through which fiscal policy can affect output and what
exactly the mechanism is behind all these estimates.
I address those issues and fill the gap in the existing literature by examining
the effect that labor productivity-enhancing government spending has on credit
spreads.
I provide a theoretical investigation of the transmission mechanism of
exogenous government spending shocks in the presence of lending relation-
ships and agency costs. Those arise due to the default probability of credit-
constrained firms that generate countercyclical spreads. In particular, I em-
ploy a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium, New Keynesian model that
has two key features: first, it allows for asymmetric information between bor-
rowers and lenders that introduces a costly state verification contract similar
to the one proposed by Townsend (1979). Second, government spending is
modeled in a way that increases the marginal productivity of labor instead of
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just being wasteful resources. This interaction between government spending
and labor productivity is important as it allows government spending to have
an effect on the cost of external finance since it negatively affects the default
probability of credit constrained firms.
My key findings are as follows: first, when government spending increases
the marginal productivity of labor in the presence of an external finance risk
premium, it negatively affects the cost of external finance and as a result there
is an amplified increase in output. There are three main channels through
which higher government spending negatively affects the marginal cost of pro-
duction leading to an amplified increase in output: the first channel has to do
with the negative impact of an increase in the labor productivity due to the
increase in government spending on the marginal cost of production. The sec-
ond channel is a continuation of the first since after the drop in the marginal
cost and inflation, the interest rate drops and due to the presence of the cost
channel there is an even larger drop of the marginal cost. The final channel
connects the increase in the marginal productivity of labor with the decrease
in the threshold level of default, the default probability and, thus, the risk
premium.
The second main finding of the paper is that the above results are in
accordance to what is suggested by the data, and have certain implications for
the estimated effect of government spending on output. Finally, those results
provide further evidence to the ongoing debate regarding the crowding-out
effect of increased government demand on private consumption.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way: in the second
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section I display the economic model and the results of the computed impulse
response functions. Concluding comments are contained in the last section of
this paper.
2.2 The Model Economy
The economy studied in the present paper consists of households,a production
sector made of manufacturers and retailers, the financial sector, and a govern-
ment. Households maximize their expected present discounted lifetime utility
by optimally making consumption-saving and labor-leisure choices. Moreover,
they own both the production and financial sector.
Manufacturers produce intermediate goods using as inputs the labor sup-
plied by the households, and aggregate government investment. They need to
borrow from financial intermediaries to finance working capital loans prior to
the realization of sales revenues. Moreover, they are subject to idiosyncratic
shocks that differentiate them ex-post and, thus, they face a probability of
default.
Financial intermediaries transform households’ savings into loans to man-
ufacturers. There is a costly state verification which implies that the interest
rate on risky loans will be a mark-up over the deposit rate.
Retailers produce final consumption goods, using the intermediate goods,
produced by manufacturers, subject to Calvo-staggered price setting in a mo-
nopolistically competitive market.
In the following sections I will describe the problem of each agent and
their optimal conditions that need to be satisfied in equilibrium. Allowing
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for nominal rigidities and employing a New Keynesian model will allow me
to examine the effect of government spending shocks on inflation dynamics
in the presence of the cost channel and allow for future examination of the
interaction of monetary policy with fiscal policy in this economy.
2.2.1 Manufacturers
There is a continuum of ex-ante identical perfectly competitive manufacturers
of mass one, indexed by  ∈ [0, 1]. In each period t, manufacturers use labor
from households, lt(), and aggregate government transfers, gt, as inputs in
the following constant returns to scale production function for intermediate
products, Y sm,t(), :
Y sm,t(j) = At(j)ht(j) (2.1)
where
ht(j) ≡ [ξl()νt + (1− ξ)gνt ]
1
ν , 0 < ξ < 1 (2.2)
where ξ is the share of labor in the production of intermediate goods and
ht() is the composite of labor and aggregate government spending defined by
the CES function presented by equation 2.13. Moreover, parameter ν governs
the elasticity of substitution between labor and government spending in the
production function, which is equal to 1
1−ν .
Manufacturers are subject to a working capital requirement; in each period
the -th manufacturer needs to borrow from financial intermediaries, Dt(),
in order to finance a fraction δ of the wage bill prior to the realization of
sales revenues. They are subject to an idiosyncratic productivity shock, At(),
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which is uniformly distributed in the interval At() ∈ [0, A¯]. The choice of the
uniform distribution allows as to obtain analytical results while assuming a
continuum of idiosyncratic shocks.
Ex-post differentiated manufacturers choose whether to default or not, if
the realized shock is below or above a certain-threshold value A∗t (), which is
going to be defined below as the break-even point. Their final output is sold
at the price Qt() per unit to retailers in order to produce the differentiated
final products.
Similar to BGG, there is a costly state verification problem, first introduced
by Townsend (1979), between manufacturers and financial intermediaries: due
to the idiosyncratic uncertainty, according to which manufacturers may default
or not, and the presence of informational asymmetries, regarding the true state
of the manufacturers, risk-neutral financial intermediaries need to pay a fixed
monitoring cost, µ, as a share of output, in the case of manufacturer’s decision
to default, to be able to identify manufacturer’s real state. In order to be
compensated for the monitoring cost and the losses coming from defaulted
loans, perfectly competitive manufacturers charge a gross-rate RLt on loans
which is above the risk-free gross rate, Rt on deposits.
For the manufacturers to be able to obtain the working capital loan a
contract needs to be defined between the manufacturers and financial inter-
mediaries in the beginning of each period. The financial intermediaries will
accept the transaction as long as it delivers an expected return which is at
least as equal to their outside option.
According the the costly state verification problem, the  manufacturer
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chooces the amount of labor, lt()to hire, in order to maximize its expected
profits:
max
A∗t (j),lt(j)
∫ A¯
A∗t
[QtAt(j)ht(j)−RLt Dt]dF (At) (2.3)
subject to the participation constraint of the financial intermediary:
∫ A∗t (j)
0
[QtAt(j)ht(j)− µQtAt(j)ht(j)]dF (At) +
∫ A¯
A∗t (j)
RLt DtdF (At) ≥ RtDt
and the liquidity-in-advance constraint:
Dt(j) ≥ δWtlt(j) (2.4)
where A∗t () is the threshold value of the idiosyncratic shock below which
manufacturers default. It is defined as the break-even point:
A∗t (j) =
RLt Dt(j)
Qtht(j)
(2.5)
that is, A∗t () is the level of the realized idiosyncratic shock at which man-
ufacturers are indifferent between paying back the loan or defaulting.
According to the participation constraint, financial intermediaries will be
willing to participate if their expected total revenues, in the left-hand side, are
higher than their opportunity cost on the right-hand side.
To write the problem in a more conventional way I define:
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φ(A∗t ) ≡
∫ A¯
A∗t
(At−A∗t )dF (At) , γ(A∗t ) ≡
∫ A∗t
0
At(1−µ)dF (At) +
∫ A¯
A∗t
A∗tdF (At)
(2.6)
The later together with the liquidity-in advance constraint (5), holding with
equality, and the definition of the threshold A∗t () allows me to write the op-
timal contract as follows:
max
A∗t (j),lt(j)
Qtht(j)φ(A
∗
t ) (2.7)
and the constraint is reduced to:
Qtht(j)γ(A
∗
t ) ≥ Rft δWtlt (2.8)
Taking the first order conditions with respect to labor I obtain the following
condition:
Qth`,t =
δRtWt
Φ(A∗t )
(2.9)
where,
Φ(A∗t ) ≡
φ′(A∗t )γ(A
∗
t )− γ′(A∗t )φ(A∗t )
φ′(A∗t )
(2.10)
according to which the marginal product of labor, in the left-hand side, equals
the marginal cost of the extra unit of labor, in the right- hand side.
A couple of interesting relationships are depicted in equation 2.21. In order
to understand them it is important to consider the simplest case where ξ = 1
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i.e., production is linear in labor, and there is no liquidity-in advance constraint
i.e., there are not credit frictions in the financial markets. Then government
spending would not enter the production function and manufacturers would
not need to externally finance working capital loans. In this case we would
obtain the standard optimality condition according to which the marginal
product of labor would be equal to the real wage rate.
In a case where ξ = 1 and firms need to borrow working capital loans
but there are no agency costs then equation 2.21 would have been similar to
Ravenna’s and Walsh’s (2006) optimal condition that describes the cost chan-
nel of monetary policy transmission. In this case a wedge between the marginal
product of labor and the marginal cost would exist due to the presence of the
risk-free interest rate that would distort the dynamics of the system and the
Phillips curve.
On the other hand, when agency costs play a key role, as is the case in
the present paper, it is not only the risk-free rate that distorts the equilibrium
condition but also the spread defined as the ratio of the risky rate, RLt , and
the risk-free rate Rt.
Notice that there is a distortion on the first order condition due to the
presence of the spread in the denominator of equation (10).
By combining the break-even equation 2.17 and the first order conditions,
we can derive an expression for the spread i.e., the ratio of the risky-rate and
the risk-free rate:
RLt
Rt
=
A∗t
γ(A∗t )
(2.11)
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The higher the threshold value of default, A∗t (), below which manufactur-
ers default, the higher the spread since γ′(A∗t ()) < 0.
In the case where on top of the agency costs government spending in the
form of transfers to the productive sector of the economy, has a real effect in
equilibrium, the fist order condition incorporates additional channels in the
following way: on one hand, when government spending, becomes productive
it increases the marginal product of the private inputs, in this case labor, and,
thus, has a cost-alleviating effect, since higher marginal product means that
manufacturers will need less external finance. On the other hand, the break-
even level A∗t , is decreasing in government spending. This follows from the
fact that since manufacturers are less dependent on the external finance, they
face a lower cost of borrowing and have a lower probability of default.
The above analysis implies that when transfers have a non neutral effect,
not only increase the marginal product of labor but also they negatively affect
the probability of default and through that the spread faced by the liquidity
constrained firms. As a result the wedge between the marginal product of
labor and the marginal cost in equation 10 decreases.
An important feature of the model needs to be outlined at this point.
In this model economy, credit spreads arise even though there is no market
power in the banking system but they exist due to the presence of agency costs.
Moreover, the negative relationship between government spending and spreads
is crucial because it is in accordance with the empirical documentation of the
countercyclical nature of risk premia (as shown by Aliaga-Dı´az and Olivero
(2010a, 2010b) ).
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2.2.2 Retailers
There is a continuum of mass one of retailers, indexed by ı ∈ [0, 1]. Retailers
use as input the homogeneous good produced by manufacturers and transform
it into differentiated final consumption goods using the following technology:
Yt(i) = X¯Y
d
t,m(i) (2.12)
where Yt(i) is the supply of final goods by i -th retailer and Y
d
t,m(i) is the
demand for intermediate goods by the ı-th retiler.X¯ is a scale.
There is a random match, one-to-one, between retailers and manufacturers
so that Y sm,t() = Y
d
m,t(ı). Retailers operate in a monopolistically competitive
market and they are subject to Calvo-type nominal rigidities i.e., there is a
constant probability φ according to which they can reset their price in each
period.
The ı-th retailer chooses the selling price Pt(ı), which later is going to
be defined as the economy-wide price index, that maximizes the present dis-
counted value of its lifetime profits. The profit maximization problem is the
following:
max
pt(i)
Et
∞∑
k=0
ϕkΓt,t+k[(Pt(i)−MCt+k)Ym,t+k(i)]
subject to:
Yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−η
Yt
where Γt,t+k = β
t+k Uc,t+k
Uc,t
Pt
Pt+k
is the representative household’s stochastic
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discount factor and MCt =
Qt
X¯
is the nominal marginal cost.
From the first order conditions we get the optimal price rule for retailer ı:
P ∗i,t
Pt
=
η
η − 1
Et
∑∞
k=0 β
k Uc,t+k
Uc,t
MCnt+k
Pt+k
(
Pt+k
Pt
)η
Yt+k
Et
∑∞
k=0 β
k Uc,t+k
Uc,t
(
Pt+k
Pt
)η−1
Yt+k
(2.13)
2.2.3 Households
The representative household has the following expected lifetime utility:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
C1−σt
1− σ − γ
l1+θt
1 + θ
]
, σ > 0 , θ ≥ 0 (2.14)
where lt =
∫

lt()d is the total supply of labor, θ is the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply, and σ is the constant relative risk aversion coefficient.
The term Ct is the composite of imperfectly substitutable final goods indexed
by , consumed by the representative household:
Ct =
[∫ 1
0
ct(i)
η−1
η di
] η
η−1
(2.15)
where η is the elasticity of substitution of the differentiated consumption
goods.
The households optimal demand for the final good ı is:
ct(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−η
Ct
where Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(ı)
1−ηdı
] 1
1−η
is the economy-wide consumer-price index.
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Households have access to one-period government bonds that yield the risk-
free interest rate Rt. Moreover, they receive labor income Wtlt, where Wt is
the nominal wage, and they pay distortionary taxes with a marginal rate τ dt .
As owners of both the production and the financial sectors, they receive all
the profits coming from manufacturers,
∫ 1
0
pimt (j) dj, retailers
∫ 1
0
pirt (i) di, and
from the financial intermediary pift .
The households seeks to maximize equation 2.27 subject to the following
budget constraint:
Mt+Bt+PtCt+Tt ≤Mt−1+(1−τ dt )Ptwtlt+RtBt−1+
∫ 1
0
pimt (j) dj+
∫ 1
0
pirt (i) di+pi
f
t
(2.16)
and the cash-in-advance constraint:
PtCt ≤Mt−1 + (1− τ dt )Wtlt −Bt (2.17)
Equation2. 30 is the standard budget constraint according to which total
expenditure (in the left-hand side) cannot exceed total resources coming from
money balances at the previous period, net wages, interest payments on bonds,
and the sum of the rebated profits (in the righ-hand side). Equation 2.31 is
the cash-in-advance constraint according to which households’ consumption
expenditure cannot exceed the outstanding money balances plus the net labor
income net of distortionary taxes and the resources devoted to the purchase
of bonds.
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The first order conditions to the households problem are the following:
(1− τ dt )wt = Cσt γlθt (2.18)
C−σt = βEt
Rt
pit+1
c−σt+1 (2.19)
where pit+1 ≡ Pt+1Pt is the gross CPI inflation.
Equation 2.33 is the standard Euler equation that defines the growth path
of consumption as a function of the real interest rate and equation 2.32 de-
scribes the labor supply of households.
2.2.4 Government
The government is made of a monetary and a fiscal authority acting indepen-
dently. The monetary authority sets the risk-free interest rate, Rt following a
simple Taylor rule:
Rt = pi
ρpi
t ρpi > 1 (2.20)
The rule is active; namely the risk-free interest rate responds to a change in
inflation by even more i.e. ρpi > 1.
Regarding the fiscal policy we examine three different financing schemes. In
all cases, similar to Villaverde (2010) and Linnemann and Schabert (2006), we
assume the following exogenous autoregressive process for government spend-
ing:
gt = g
ρg
t−1exp(t) (2.21)
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In the first financing scheme the government has a balanced budget and
finances government spending only with lump sum taxes. Its budget constraint
is:
gt = Tt (2.22)
In the second financing scheme the government has a balanced budget using
only distortionary taxes. Its budget constraint is:
gt = τ
d
tWtlt (2.23)
In the last financing scheme I assume that the government on top of the
distortionary taxation issues debt and the budget constraint becomes:
BGt + Ptτ
d
t wtlt = RtB
G
t−1 + Ptgt (2.24)
2.2.5 Equilibrium
I consider a semi-symmetric equilibrium where all manufacturing firms behave
in the same way, as well as retailers and households. Thus, we can drop the
indeces and solve for a representative agent in each category. In particular, we
assume that ht() = ht, Ym,t() = Ym,t, Yt(ı) = Yt, and A
∗
t () = A
∗
t .
I define the equilibrium as the set of allocations (ct, bt, lt), and prices (Qt, Pt,
Rt, Rt,Wt), given the exogenous process for (gt), that satisfies
• households’ first order conditions
• manufacturers’ first order conditions
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• retailers’ first order conditions
• and the following market clearing conditions:
In the market of goods:
Yt = Ct +Gt (2.25)
In the market of intermediate goods:
∫
i
y(i)t,mdi =
∫
j∈Ξt
At(j)ht(j)(1− µ)dj +
∫
j /∈Ξt
At(j)ht(j)dj (2.26)
where Ξt = [j ∈ [0.1] : At(j) < At(j)∗] is the default set. One can write
this more conveniently as:
htψ(A
∗
t ) =
1
X¯
Yt (2.27)
where ψ(A∗t ) is a function of parameters.
In the labor market:
∫
i
lst (i)di =
∫
j
ldt (j)dj (2.28)
2.2.6 Aggregate Dynamics
I log-linearize all the equilibrium conditions around the unique steady state. I
can summarize all the equilibrium conditions below.
By log-linearizing the Euler equation and imposing market clearing condi-
tion we get:
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yˆt = Etyˆt+1 − sc
σ
(
Rˆt − Etpˆit+1
)
+ sg (gˆt − Etgˆt+1) (2.29)
where sc ≡ CY and sg ≡ gy .
The Phillips-curve is given by the following equation:
pit = βEt ˆpit+1 + κmˆct (2.30)
where k ≡ (1−βφ)(1−φ)
φ
The linearized real marginal cost is equal to mˆct = qˆt, where qˆt is the
relative price of the intermediate products. In equilibrium :
mˆct = Rˆt + wˆt − hˆl,t − Φˆ(A∗t ) (2.31)
where hˆl,t and Φˆ(A
∗
t ) are defined in the appendix.
The important thing to notice here is the presence of the risk-free rate, Rˆt,
and the spread that lies in the variable ˆΦ(A∗t ), in the log-linearized marginal
cost. Moreover, notice that government spending affects both the A∗t and,
thus, ˆΦ(A∗t ) as well as the log-linearized marginal productivity of labor. As
a result, both the spread and government spending are going to affect the
Phillips curve.
The log-linearized final goods market clearing condition is given by:
yˆt = sccˆt + sggˆt (2.32)
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and the intermediate goods market clearing condition by:
hˆt + ˆψ(A∗t ) = yˆt (2.33)
where ˆψ(A∗t ) is defined in the appendix.
The equilibrium log-linearized spread is given by the following condition:
RˆLt − Rˆt = Aˆ∗t − ˆγ(A∗t ) (2.34)
where
Aˆ∗t =
ν
a1
1
ω
(yˆt − gˆt) (2.35)
where a1 and ω are parameters.
From the above equilibrium conditions, it is clear that government spending
affects A∗t ,as it will become more clear with the impulse response functions,
and through that the spread. In particular, it will be shown in the following
sections that there is a negative relationship between government spending
and the threshold level of default. Since the spread appears in the Phillips
curve and it is negatively affected by government spending this implies that
government spending shocks will decrease the marginal cost and thus inflation.
2.2.7 Calibration and Impulse Response Functions
This section provides the benchmark values assigned to the parameters that
are needed for the computation of the impulse response functions and discusses
the motivation behind the specific values.
The table below presents the values of the standard parameters:
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parameter value
steady-state employment l 1/3
discount factor β 0.99
labor inverse elasticity θ 1
elasticity of substitution η 8
degree of price stickiness φ 0.75
I set the steady-state level of employment equal to 1/3 as it is standard
in the literature, like Linnemann and Schabert (2006). Also, we set the quar-
terly discount factor to 0.99 as it is standard in the literature (BGG) so that
the steady state annual interest rate is approximately, 4%. I assume a labor
inverse elasticity parameter θ equal to 1 as it is standard in the business cy-
cle literature, following Linnemann and Schabert (2006). Following, Demirel
(2007) I set the elasticity of substitution across varieties equal to 8. The re-
sults remain the same if we pick a value equal to 6, following Linnemann and
Schabert (2006). The degree of price stickiness is set equal to 0.75 following
BGG and Gali and Gertler (1999), so that the average period before the fully
adjustment of the price is one year. Finally, the government spending share is
equal to 0.2 as it is standard in the literature, like in Linnemann and Schabert
(2005), which is the sample average of the variable in US post-war macro data.
The following table presents the values of the non-standard parameters of
the model:
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parameter value
monitoring cost µ 0.12
government spending share g
y
0.2
upper bound A¯ 1.82
labor share ξ [0.01 ,0.8]
factor elasticity of substitution ν [-1 , 1]
I set the monitoring cost equal to 0.12 as it is standard in the literature
that discusses the costly state verification problem, like BGG, and Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997). This value is within the set of the estimated values of
bankruptcy costs as it is discussed by BGG. However, as a robustness check
we try different values that range from 0 to 0.25 which is the highest estimated
value observed in the literature on bankruptcy costs.
Regarding the upper bound of the idiosyncratic shock we follow Demirel
(2007) and try different values between 1.82 and 2. The results seem to be
robust. Moreover, since there is no standard consensus in the literature on the
degree of substitutability between public factors/inputs and private inputs we
try different parameters for the factor elasticity of substitution as well as for
the labor share in the production function. Linnemann and Schabert set the
production elasticity of government expenditures equal to 0.2, which lies in
the set of values that we consider in this paper. The results seem to be robust
in the different specifications. Finally, we set the autoregressive parameter ρg
equal to 0.9 following Schmitt-Grohe´, S., and M. Uribe (2006) and the policy
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parameter ρpi > 1 following the literature (Woodford 2003) and the empirical
evidence on central bank behavior (Clarida et al., 2000).
Figures 8 and 9 illustrate the impulse response functions of the main vari-
ables i.e., output, inflation, consumption, employment, wages, marginal cost,
interest rate spread, and the threshold value of default, when the government
holds a balanced budget by issuing only lump sum taxes, after a positive shock
to government spending of 1%. The impulse response functions are computed
for three different models: the fist model is the benchmark model presented in
the previous sections where the two key features are that government spending
increases the marginal productivity of labor, and agency costs give rise to a
risk premium depicted by the credit spread. The second modeled examines
the effect of a government spending shock when government spending affects
the marginal productivity of labor in the absence of agency costs and the last
model examines the effect of an expansionary government spending shock in a
standard New Keynesian model as in Yun (1996). Below I discuss the results
for the case where I set ν = 0.01 is which case the CES production function
reduces at the limit to a homogeneous of degree one Cobb-Douglas function.
as a robustness check I present also the impulse response functions for different
values of the parameter that governs the factor elasticity of substitution.
Regarding the supply side of the economy, a positive 1% shock to govern-
ment spending results in a decrease of the marginal cost of production and
as a result to a reduction of inflation for three main reasons: fist of all, since
government spending is used in the production function of the intermediate
goods, it enhances the marginal productivity of labor. An increase in the labor
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productivity reduces the marginal cost of production, as the optimal condition
for the demand for labor suggests. Second, the decrease in inflation, as a result
of the negative effect of government spending on the marginal cost discussed
above, results in a decrease of the risk-free interest rate, due to the assumption
that the interest rate follows an active rule and ρpi > 1. Since the cost channel
of monetary policy is present in the inflation equation, a drop in the interest
rate will lead to an even further reduction of the marginal cost. Finally, the
channel that is added on top of the previous channels is the negative effect
that government spending has through the labor productivity on the threshold
level of default A∗. As figure 8 shows, a positive shock to government spending
has a negative effect on the threshold level of default which in turn reduces
the interest rate spread. Lower spreads allow firms to borrow at lower cost
and increase the production frontier.
On the other hand, on the demand side of the economy, a positive shock to
government spending results in a negative wealth effect, that induces house-
holds increase the supply of labor. However, the lower interest rate affects the
growth rate of consumption and causes consumption to increase, a result that
is supported by the empirical literature (Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fatas
and Mihov (2002) Gali et al. (2004)).
Those results are robust when different financing schemes are considered.
Figures 10 and 11 illustrate the case where the government is using distor-
tionary taxes on labor income to maintain a balanced budget. After a posi-
tive shock to government spending the threshold level of default and thus the
spread respond negatively. As a result the marginal cost decreases as well
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as inflation. By comparing the impulse response functions of the benchmark
model with the ones computed for the second model, where there are no agency
costs, one can observe the following important result: it is the interaction of
productivity enhancing government spending with the risk premium that can
outweigh the increase in the equilibrium wage and decrease the marginal cost
of production. When the government finances the increase in public spending
with distortionary taxes, a strong negative substitution effect induces house-
holds to substitute labor with consumption and leisure. The drop in labor
supply in both cases is accompanied by an increase in labor demand as a
result of the higher productivity of labor. However, in the benchmark case
apart from the labor productivity, it is the reduced cost of borrowing that
allows firms to increase their production even more and thus, employ more
labor. As a result, the presence of the agency costs and the risk premium
have an amplified effect on output in comparison the a case where there are
no credit market imperfections.
The above result is of immense importance. In particular the exact effect
of government spending on private consumption remains still a matter of de-
bate. Some theoretical studies support the view of a strong negative wealth
effect resulting from an increase in government demand, leading to a crowding-
out effect of private consumption (see for example Baxter and King (1993),
Cambell (1994), Linnemann and Schabert (2003)). On the other hand, the
empirical literature has provided evidence that positive government demand
shocks increase private consumption (see for example Blanchard and Perotti
(2002), Gali et al. (2004), Fatas and Mihov (2002)). The main justification
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of the positive effect of government spending shocks to consumption provided
by the recent literature relies on the fact that government spending increases
the productivity of the private inputs (see for example Linnemann and Sch-
abert (2006)). The results illustrated in the above figures, however, suggest
that when the increase in government spending is financed with distortionary
taxation, productivity enhancing government spending crowds-out private con-
sumption. However, when credit market imperfections are present then, there
is an interaction with the effect that government spending has on the pro-
ductivity of labor and the effect that it has on the probability of default of
credit-constrained firms. In this case, even when the financing decisions by
the government distort the optimality conditions of households, a crowd-in
effect of private consumption is possible, as a result of the amplified increase
of output.
Moreover, the above results remain valid even in the case where the govern-
ment issues debt in order to finance the increase in the government spending
apart from increasing the labor income taxes.
Following, Leeper (1999) I assume that there is a “passive” policy rule for
the marginal tax rate on labor income, which, in deviations from the steady-
state is:
τˆ dt = zbˆt−1 z > 0 (2.36)
In this case, the government can increase its deficit in the short term but
in the longer term the debt should return to its steady state. This means
that the government is not required to keep a balanced budget in the short
term as long as the budget is balanced in the long term. To bring debt back
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to a long term stability, there must be some interaction between the tax rate
and the outstanding debt. This rule is a simple case of a tax-rate rule that
allows government to keep its debt under a long term stability. According
to Leeper (1999), determinancy requires that an “active” interest rate rule
should be followed by a passive fiscal policy, or in other words, a tax rate
that responds “passively” to the government debt shocks. The simplicity of
this rule allows one to consider an empirically more reasonable case for fiscal
policy while avoiding any unnecessary complexity of the model. A higher
value of z means that a higher share of government spending is financed with
distortionary taxation. Thus, figures 12 and 13, show that the negative effect
of productivity enhancing government spending on the spread still holds. The
only difference is that since higher debt leads to a larger fraction of government
spending to be financed by distortionary taxes which has a larger impact on
labor supply in comparison the the previous case.
Finally, the impulse response functions have been computed for different
values of ξ, the share of labor, µ, the magnitude of monitoring cost, and ν
the parameter that governs the factor elasticity of substitution. The impulse
response functions are shown in the appendix.
To sum up, the above analysis has shed light to three main results: first, in
the presence of an external finance risk premium, when government spending
is productivity enhancing, it affects negatively the cost of external finance and
as a result there is an amplified increase in output. This result is robust for
different financing schemes followed by the government. Second, those results
are in accordance to what is suggested by the data, and has certain implications
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for the estimated effect of government spending on output. Finally, those
results provide further evidence to the ongoing debate regarding the crowding-
out effect of increased government demand on private consumption.
2.3 Conclusion
This paper studies the effects of exogenous government spending shocks on
credit spreads, when government spending has a productivity-enhancing role in
the economy. The main motivation for this analysis is a key feature present in
the U.S. data, mainly that exogenous increases in government spending have a
negative effect on credit spreads. In particular, it is illustrated by the empirical
specification that government investment is the part of government spending
responsible for this negative effect. This paper addresses this key finding
in the data. The main finding of the paper is that productivity-enhancing
government spending has a negative effect on the probability of default of
credit-constrained firms and, thus, decreases the risk premium.
An important direction for future research is to consider the effect of pro-
ductive public capital on the crowding-out of private investment. The impor-
tance of the potential results is connected to the consequences of a negative
effect of public capital on credit spreads and thus, on the investment choices
of the private sector.
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Chapter 3: Creditworthiness, lenders’ leverage, and
unconventional credit policies
3.1 Introduction
There are certain facts that characterize the recent global financial crisis which
underscore the need to reconsider the transmission of aggregate shocks from
the financial to the real sector. Many studies have documented that at the
onset of the recent crisis the deterioration of asset prices was followed by
a widening of credit spreads, a higher risk attached to many non-financial
institutions, and a sharp decrease of banks’ capital-to-assets ratios leading to
binding bank capital requirements.1At the same time, the U.S., and many
countries in the Euro-zone, have engaged in the so called “unconventional”
credit policies consisting mostly of credit injections into private markets in
order to help their economies recover from the recent crisis. For example, the
Federal Reserve System engaged in the purchase of a total of $1.75 trillion
in agency debt, mortgage-backed securities and Treasuries, while the Bank
of England purchased assets for approximately £275 billion. In practice, we
could divide those policies into two broad categories. The first one involved
direct government lending to firms to help revive the commercial paper market.
1See, Corbae and D’Erasmo (2013), Lambertini and Uysal (2013), among others.
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The second one included equity injections into the banking system under the
Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP).
This evidence gives rise to two main questions: how does the economy
respond in a crisis experiment when credit frictions originate from both the
supply-side and the demand-side of credit markets? How are alternative un-
conventional credit policies different in their real effects in an environment
where both types of credit frictions are present?
Several papers have studied the key elements relevant to the recent crisis.
However, they have focused on the effects of credit market imperfections origi-
nating from either the borrowers or the lenders side, without considering them
together. On one hand, Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2012), examine how agency costs and limited commitment on behalf of fi-
nancial intermediaries can reduce the availability of credit and increase credit
spreads without considering potential constraints with regard to the demand
side of the credit market. In addition, they provide a framework to study the
aforementioned unconventional credit policies interacted with the disruptions
of the flow of funds between borrowers and lenders. Nevertheless, those studies
provide limited intuition for why the government has implemented different
policies given that they consider credit frictions emanating from one side of
the market.2
On the other hand, models based on the financial accelerator mechanism
2As stated in a comment by Cole (2011), the key friction in those works comes from the
fear that intermediaries might steal depositors’ money rather than the possibility that they
will take on excessive risk. Moreover, he suggests that while changing the way of modeling
the friction in the banking side may not significantly change the results, it may reduce the
ability of the government to stimulate the economy.
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proposed by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1999) (hereafter BGG), emphasize credit constraints resulting from higher
agency costs associated with the real sector, treating the financial sector as a
veil.
This paper contributes to this debate in several ways. First, to the best
of my knowledge, this is the first paper to assess the two aforementioned
credit policies in the presence of both supply-side and demand-side credit
frictions. In particular, I consider a case where the financial intermediaries’
frictions are the result of having an upper bound on their leverage and due
to lenders’ exposure to aggregate risk as opposed to the possibility to divert
their available funds. I show that there is an important interaction between
this and entrepreneurial risk that leads to higher spreads and more sensitivity
of the economy to aggregate shocks.
Second, I show that the two policies play a significant role in moderating
the recession. Nevertheless, the channels through which they are transmitted
are different and have certain implications, that need to be accounted for
by policy makers. Importantly, while Gertler and Kiyotaki (2012) suggest
that introducing asset heterogeneity will show how the two policies should be
allocated, I prove that even without introducing asset heterogeneity, but solely
considering the presence of credit frictions both in the demand and the supply
side of the market, the two policies may lead to different results. This justifies
the choice of many countries to apply both policies to mitigate the recent
recession. In particular, it is argued that the two main policies affected the
causes and the effects of the recent crisis. Equity injections meant to prevent
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banks from decreasing their credit supply due to increased leverage. On the
other hand, direct lending was used to allow firms to access credit that they
would not have otherwise, and, thus, prevent the negative effects on output
during the crisis.
In order to address the above issues, I extend the standard financial ac-
celerator framework of Bernanke Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) to include a
fully-fledged banking sector subjected to a leverage constraint, along the lines
of Repullo and Suarez (2009), Aliaga-Dı´az and Olivero (2010), and Corbae
and D’Erasmo (2013). I show that, within this context, an aggregate contrac-
tionary shock affects the real economy via two main credit-related channels.
First, it generates a deterioration of banks’ balance sheets, leading to a de-
crease in the banks’ capital position. The upper bound on banks’ leverage
becomes binding causing them to decrease the available credit supply, and
resulting in the demand for higher returns on loans. Second, it increases en-
trepreneurs’ default risk which then influences firms’ equity holdings as well
as banks’ capital position. Facing a higher probability of losses, banks require
higher expected returns on loans, thus increasing the external finance premium
on the firms’ borrowing. The interaction between the financial accelerator and
the bank leverage channel results in higher spreads and larger negative re-
sponses of output with respect to what suggested in the literature focusing on
either one of the two frictions.
For example, in the standard BGG model, after a 1% decrease in total
factor productivity (TFP), output falls by 1% whereas in the model economy
studied in this paper, it falls by 3%. The negative shock to TFP increases
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the amount of defaulted loans and decreases the expected returns on loans for
banks. As a result, the leverage constraint of banks becomes more binding.
Banks respond by decreasing the credit supply, which in turn raises credit
spreads. Higher default probability and lower credit supply result in higher
borrowing costs that deteriorate the entrepreneurial net worth. This leads to
higher entrepreneurial leverage, raising the borrowing costs even more.
The quantitative analysis shows that equity injections to the banking sector
can mitigate the response of output to a negative shock to capital quality, (as a
proxy for crisis), by 1% more than direct lending to entrepreneurs. In addition,
it is shown that the recovery to the long-run equilibrium under equity injections
is faster than in the case with direct lending. This results from the fact that, as
shown in this paper, equity injections affect the frictions originating from the
lenders’ side while direct lending affects the frictions on the borrowers’ side.
However, during a financial distress, equity injections into the banking system
work better than direct lending to non-financial firms. The intuition is that
the former increases the ability of the government to stimulate the economy
(by reducing the credit crunch) than the latter.
This paper is linked to three main strands in literature. The first one
consists of papers building on the financial accelerator model first developed
by Bernanke, Gertler and Girlchrist (1999), such as Villaverde (2010), Chris-
tiano, Motto and Rostagno (2013), Carstrom, Fuerst and Paustian (2013), and
Dimitriev and Hoddenbagh (2013). However, in most of these contributions,
financial intermediaries are redundant since their returns from loans are not
affected by aggregate shocks in the economy. As a result, any change in the
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external finance premium is driven only by shifts in the demand for credit.
Building on the contribution by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), several papers
model a similar friction by studying the interaction between the borrowers’
collateral prices and loan rates. Prominent examples are works by Caballero
and Krisnamurhty (2001, 2003), Bianchi (2011), and Bianchi and Mendoza
(2011).3
The second strand of literature to which this paper is related to, deals with
frictions in the supply side of the credit market, as in Van den Heuvel (2007),
Aliaga-Dı´az and Olivero (2010), Corbae and D’Erasmo (2013), Lambertini
and Uysal (2013), and Repullo and Suarez (2012). Nevertheless, despite the
relevant insights, these works typically abstract from frictions originating from
the demand side.
Finally, this paper is closely connected to the large number of contribu-
tions discussing the macroeconomic effects of unconventional credit policies, of
which the most prominent are Gertler and Karadi (2011), Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2012), and Gertler, Kiyotaki and Queralto (2011). Although their analysis
and results are insightful, they are restricted to the effects of macro-prudential
policies taming frictions coming only from the supply side of credit. This
limitation does not allow them to assess the different channels through which
alternative credit policies are transmitted, concluding that they have similar
effects. On the contrary, my paper shows that different credit policies have
important implications as soon as one considers their interactions with both
types of credit frictions.
3However, Krishnamurhty (2003) has proven that the amplification effect in those models
disappears when there are collateralized state-contingent contracts.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2, describes
the model. Section 3.3, discusses the model’s response to aggregate shocks.
Section 3.4, assesses the two main credit policies discussed in the Introduction.
Section 3.5 concludes and provides a discussion about future research.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Overview
I extend the standard financial accelerator framework of Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist (1999), to include a fully-fledged banking sector subjected to a
leverage constraint, along the lines of Aliaga-Dı´az, and Olivero (2010).
The model uses a dynamic stochastic New Keynesian framework allow-
ing for the presence of a financial accelerator effect on both investment and
credit. The structure of the model economy is the following: it is popu-
lated by entrepreneurs, capital producers, retailers, households, banks, and
the government-monetary authority.
In the remainder of this section I describe the agents’ problems and their
decisions.
3.2.2 Banks
Banks issue loans, Bt+1, to risky entrepreneurs at the end of period t, in
a competitive market. Due to aggregate uncertainty, loans yield a risky real
return, RBt+1, at the beginning of period t+1 when debts are repaid. Given that
banks hold a diversified portfolio of assets only the aggregate risk is present
in banks’ returns.
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Loans are financed with both internal and external resources. Internal
resources are made of net worth (equity), NBt+1, coming from accumulated
retained earnings, whereas external resources are due to debt raised from
households’ deposits. In particular, at the end of period t banks raise de-
posits, Dt+1, from households and pay back the real-risk-free rate of return
on deposits, Rt+1, at the beginning of period t + 1. The balance sheet for a
representative bank is the following:
Bt+1 = Dt+1 +N
B
t+1. (3.1)
According to equation 3.1, in every period, the value of loans made to en-
trepreneurs should be equal to the sum of internal funds, i.e. equity, and
external funds, i.e. deposits.
Letting NBt denote beginning-of-period net worth and REt+1 retain earn-
ings, banks’ net worth evolves as follows:
NBt+1 = REt+1 +N
B
t (3.2)
Following Myers and Majluf (1984), Jermann and Quadrini (2009), and
Aliaga-Dı´az and Olivero (2010), I assume that raising equity is more expensive
than debt. In particular, banks are taxed at a rate τ while interest rate
payments on deposits are tax exempted.
Banks face a leverage constraint according to which total debt cannot ex-
ceed a fraction (1−ξ) of their assets. This constraint imposes an upper bound
on the banks’ leverage like for example in a case where banks are subjected to
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capital requirements.4 This is in contrast to the recent literature that considers
a limited commitment on behalf of banks. Modeling banks being subject to a
leverage constraint captures what in fact happened during the recent financial
crisis, where banks were facing binding capital requirements.5 The leverage
constraint is:6
(1− ξ)Bt+1 ≥ Dt+1. (3.3)
The representative bank seeks to maximize its equity value, V Bt , which equals
the lifetime expected discounted value of dividend payments to their owners
(households):
V Bt = max
Bt+1,Dt+1
Et
∞∑
j=0
Λt,t+jDivt+j (3.4)
where Divt denotes dividends, defined
Divt +REt = (1− τ)(RBt Bt −RtDt) (3.5)
while
Λt,t+j = β
jUc(t+ j)
Uc(t)
(3.6)
is the representative household’s stochastic discounted factor.
The optimization problem stated in equation 3.4, is subject to the following
4Like for example the bank capital requirements imposed by Basel Accord.
5This is the standard assumption of the papers that study unconventional policies such
as Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki(2012).
6Using equations (1)-(3), one can write the leverage constraint, equation (3) as a bank
capital regulatory constraint NBt+1 ≥ ξBt+1.
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constraints:
NBt+1 = REt +N
B
t (3.7)
Bt+1 = Dt+1 +N
B
t+1 (3.8)
(1− ξ)Bt+1 ≥ Dt+1 (3.9)
The associated first order conditions are,
EtΛt,t+1
{
[RBt+1(1− τ) + 1]
}
= 1− ςt(1− ξ) (3.10)
EtΛt,t+1
{
[Rt+1(1− τ) + 1]
}
= 1− ςt (3.11)
µt
[
(1− ξ)Bt+1 −Dt+1
]
= 0 (3.12)
where ςt denotes the shadow value of the leverage constraint.
By combining equations 3.10 and 3.11, we obtain the following relationship:
Et
{
Λt,t+1[R
B
t+1 −Rt+1]
}
=
ξςt
(1− τ) (3.13)
There are three main factors that play a key role in creating the wedge
between the risky loan rate and the risk free rate on deposits. First, this
wedge is affected by the bindingness of the leverage constraint, as indexed by
the multiplier ςt. Banks’ ability to choose debt over equity is constrained by
the presence of the leverage constraint. When the constraint becomes more
binding – say because of a reduction in the banks’ net worth following an
adverse aggregate shock – the shadow value of the constraint, ςt, increases,
which leads to a larger “expected” credit spread.
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The second factor is the upper bound of banks’ leverage which is governed
by ξ. An increase in ξ makes the leverage constraint 3.9 stricter, which in term
increases the wedge between the risky loan rate and the risk-free rate.
Finally, the wedge depends on the tax rate τ . When the tax benefit in-
creases, the bank has an incentive to rely more on debt financing than on
equity in order to raise funds for new loans. Thus, the leverage constraint
becomes tighter which once again results in higher premium.
Equation 3.13, is a key element of differentiation between my framework
and BGG where banks’ behavior is essentially described by the following zero-
profit condition:
RBt+1 = Rt+1 (3.14)
According to equation 3.14, the banks’ profits are unaffected by aggregate risk.
On the contrary, in my framework, changes in banks’ net worth will affect the
external finance premium faced by entrepreneurs via equation 3.13.
3.2.3 Entrepreneurs
Risk-neutral entrepreneurs invest in physical capital for production purposes.
Newly purchased capital in period t is used in t+1, along with entrepreneurial
labor and households’ labor, for the production of an intermediate good in
a perfectly competitive market. In each period, an entrepreneur exits the
market with a constant probability (1 − γ). This allows me to abstract from
a case where entrepreneurs can self-finance the full spending on investment.
Moreover, I assume that the fraction of incoming entrepreneurs is such that the
share of entrepreneurs in the economy is constant across time. Entrepreneurs
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that die just exit the market and consume their accumulated wealth.
At the end of period t, the -th entrepreneur sells the entire stock of unde-
preciated capital and then purchases new capital Kt+1, at price Qt, which will
then be used in the production of the intermediate goods in t + 1. Such pur-
chase is financed through both internal funds (net worth, N jt+1), and external
funds (loans from banks, Bjt+1), as follows:
Bjt+1 = QtK
j
t+1 −N jt+1 (3.15)
Entrepreneurial projects are risky due to both aggregate and idiosyncratic risk.
The ex post return on capital in t+1 - after the realization of aggregate risk - is
ωjt+1R
k
t+1, where ω
j
t+1 is the idiosyncratic shock and R
k
t+1 is the ex post, gross,
real return averaged across firms. Similar to BGG, the idiosyncratic shock is
assumed to follow a lognormal distribution: namely, log(ω(j)) ∼ N(−1
2
σ2ω, σ
2
ω),
with a c.d.f.F (ω), over a non-negative support. Furthermore, ω is i.i.d. across
time and across firms.
There exists a threshold level for the idiosyncratic shock, ω¯t+1 below which
entrepreneurs choose to default and above which they repay their debt. In case
of default, lenders confiscate the realized returns on capital acquisitions net
of auditing costs. On the contrary, when entrepreneurs choose not to default,
they pay back a promised gross real rate of return on loans Zt+1. As a result,
the threshold value ω¯t+1 corresponds to the realized value of the idiosyncratic
shock for which entrepreneurs are indifferent between paying back their debt
and defaulting on their loans. Thus, the promised gross real return on loans
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is given by the following expression:
Zjt+1B
j
t+1 = ω¯
j
t+1R
k
t+1QtK
j
t+1 (3.16)
The realization of the idiosyncratic shock is private information to the
borrower. As a result, banks are able to verify the true state of entrepreneurs
only by forfeiting a fixed share of the return on capital. This share is a fraction
µ of the return on capital: namely, µωjt+1R
k
t+1QtK
j
t+1.
Since debt repayment is uncertain, a contract needs to be specified between
entrepreneurs and banks. The entrepreneur chooses the investment project
and the cutoff value of idiosyncratic productivity, in order to maximize the
mean return on his equity:
Et
{∫ ∞
ωjt+1
ωjt+1R
k
t+1QtK
j
t+1dF (ω
j
t+1)− [1− F (ω¯jt+1)]Zjt+1Bjt+1
}
(3.17)
According to 3.17 which in case of non-default, the entrepreneur keeps the
excess return on his investment project and pays the promised real gross return
to banks.
As in BGG, the contract includes an incentive compatibility constraint ac-
cording to which the lender needs to receive an expected return on loans equal
to the risk-free rate and the wedge between the two due to bank’s leverage
constraint. Intuitively, this wedge is present due to the fact that the lender
engages in a risky project which affects the bindingness of the leverage con-
straint. As a result, the expected return needs to consider the following link
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between lender’s return on loans and the return on deposits:
Et
{
Λt,t+1[R
B
t+1 −Rt+1]
}
=
ξςt
(1− τ) (3.18)
As BGG show there is sufficient linearity in the entrepreneurial sector to con-
sider a representative entrepreneur.
Let
[
1 − Γ(ω¯t+1)
]
, and
[
Γ(ω¯t+1) − µG(ω¯t+1)
]
, be, respectively, the en-
trepreneur’s (borrower’s) share on the project’s return and the bank’s (lender’s)
net share on the project’s return. They are defined as follows:
[
1− Γ(ω¯t+1)
]
≡
∫ ∞
ω¯t+1
ωt+1f(ωt+1)dωt+1 −
[
1− F (ω¯t+1)
]
ω¯t+1 (3.19)
[
Γ(ω¯t+1)− µG(ω¯t+1)
]
≡
[
1− F (ω¯t+1)
]
ω¯t+1 + (1− µ)
∫ ω¯t+1
0
ωt+1f(ωt+1)dωt+1
(3.20)
Letting κt ≡ QtKt+1Nt+1 denote leverage, while making use of equations 3.15,
3.16, and the following definition of the bank’s return on loans, EtRBt+1 ≡
EtRkt+1
[
Γ(ω¯t+1)−µG(ω¯t+1)
]
κt
κt−1 I can rewrite the contract problem as follows:
max
κt,ω¯t+1
Et
[
1− Γ(ω¯t+1)
]
Rkt+1κt (3.21)
subject to:
EtΛt,t+1
[
Γ(ω¯t+1)−µG(ω¯t+1)
]
Rkt+1κt =
[
EtΛt,t+1Rt+1+
ξςt
(1− τ)
]
(κt−1) (3.22)
The following two propositions state the solution to the contract problem
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and highlight the difference between my model economy and BGG:
Proposition 1. BGG model. Entrepreneurs choose leverage κt and the
threshold level of default ω¯t+1 to maximize:
max
κt,ω¯t+1
Et
[
1− Γ(ω¯t+1)
]
Rkt+1κt (3.23)
subject to
RBt+1 = Rt+1 (3.24)
The solution to this problem is the following:
Et
{[
1− Γ(ω¯t+1)
]
Rkt+1
}
κt = Et
{
Γ′(ω¯t+1)
[Γ′(ω¯t+1)− µG′(ω¯t+1)]
}
Rt+1 (3.25)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Given this solution, the log-linearized external finance premium in BGG is
given by the following two equations:
EtRˆkt+1 − RˆBt+1 = νκκˆt (3.26)
RˆBt+1 − Rˆt+1 = 0 (3.27)
where νκ is defined in Appendix A.
As stated in Proposition 1, a key assumption made by BGG is that the
banks’ return on loans is always equal to the predetermined gross, real, risk-
free rate on deposits. As equation 3.27 shows, the external finance premium is
a strictly increasing function of leverage. This implies that when, for instance,
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the entrepreneurs’ net worth decreases after an aggregate shock, the demand
for investment decreases, thus increasing the external finance premium.
Proposition 2. Model Economy. Entrepreneurs choose leverage κt and
the threshold level of default ω¯t+1 to maximize:
max
κt,ω¯t+1
Et
{[
1− Γ(ω¯t+1)
]
Rkt+1
}
κt (3.28)
subject to
EtΛt,t+1RBt+1 = EtΛt,t+1Rt+1 +
ξςt
(1− τ) (3.29)
The solution to this problem is the following:
Et
{[
1−Γ(ω¯t+1)
]
Rkt+1
}
κt =
Γ′(ω¯t+1)
[Γ′(ω¯t+1)− µG′(ω¯t+1)]Et
{
Λt,t+1
[
Rt+1+
ξςt
(1− τ)
]}
(3.30)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Given this solution in the benchmark contract, the log-linearized external fi-
nance premium is now given by the following two equations:
EtRˆkt+1 − EtRˆBt+1 = νκˆt (3.31)
EtRˆBt+1 − νREtRˆt+1 = νς ςˆt − νΛEtΛˆt,t+1 (3.32)
where νR =
R
RB
, νς =
R
RB
ξς
(1−τ) , and νΛ = 1− RRB .
Equations 3.27-3.28 and 3.32-3.33 highlight the key role played by the
constraint on banks’ leverage in my model. In particular, according to 3.32-
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3.33, part of the premium emanates from the presence of agency costs, and
part from the bindingness of banks’ leverage constraint. In bad times, when
banks’ leverage constraint binds, since banks’ profits decrease, the external
finance premium increases more than in the BGG case where it rises only due
to higher agency costs. This results from the presence of ςˆt in the premium
in equation 3.33, where νR, νς > 0 with νς > νR. In particular, the coefficient
νς in front of ςt depends on the policy parameter ξ and the advantage of debt
over equity as measured by τ . As the quantitative analysis of Section 3 will
show, the presence of ςˆt in equation 3.33, will greatly affect the amplification
of aggregate shocks with respect to the benchmark BGG.
In the remainder of this section, I describe the production decisions made
by entrepreneurs. In particular, entrepreneurs use the purchased capital in the
subsequent period in the production of the homogeneous, wholesale good. The
production of the intermediate good is constant returns to scale, which allows
for aggregation across entrepreneurs. In particular the aggregate quantity of
intermediate goods in time t is given by:
Yt = At(ΞtKt)
αL1−αt , (3.33)
where At is TFP, while Ξt denotes the quality of capital such that ΞtKt is
the effective quantity of capital used in production. At and Ξt are assumed to
follow the following AR(1) processes:
log(At) = ρalog(At−1) + At (3.34)
63
log(Ξt) = ρξlog(Ξt−1) + 
ξ
t (3.35)
where the At , 
ξ
t , are the exogenous, i.i.d. shocks to technology, and capital
quality respectively.
In equation 3.33 the term, Lt denotes total labor input, consisting of both
household labor, Ht, and “entrepreneurial” labor, H
e
t :
Lt = H
Ω
t (H
e
t )
(1−Ω) (3.36)
where Ω defines the relative importance of entrepreneurial and household labor
in the production function. One key assumption to ensure that new-coming
entrepreneurs enter the market with some initial wealth is that they provide
labor services. As in BGG, entrepreneurial labor is supplied inelastically and
is normalized to unity.
Entrepreneurs sell their wholesale goods to retailers who transform it into
the final consumption good, at the relative price 1
Xt
, where Xt is the gross
markup of retail goods over wholesale goods.
The demand curves for household and entrepreneurial labor are given by
equating the marginal product with the wage rate:
Ω
Xt
(1− α) Yt
Ht
= wt (3.37)
Ω
Xt
(1− α) Yt
Het
= wet (3.38)
Entrepreneurs sell their undepreciated capital at the end of period t + 1
back to the capital producing sector at price Q¯t. As a result the expected
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gross return to a unit of capital from t to t+ 1 is the following:
EtRkt+1 = Et
{ 1
Xt+1
αYt
Kt+1
+Qt+1(1− δ)
Qt
}
(3.39)
Entrepreneurial aggregate net worth at the end of period t, is given by
Nt = γVt + w
e
t , (3.40)
where Vt denotes entrepreneurial equity
Vt =
[
1− Γ(ω¯t)
]
κt−1. (3.41)
Therefore, γVt is the accumulated equity from t−1 from surviving entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurs that die with probability (1−γ) in the previous period consume
their residual equity, i.e. Cet = (1− γ)Vt.
3.2.4 Capital Producing firms
Perfectly competitive capital producing firms use physical investment, It, and
undepreciated capital, (1 − δ)Kt, to produce new capital, Kt+1 to be sold to
entrepreneurs, according to the following production function:
Φ
( It
Kt
)
Kt =
φk
2
( It
Kt
− δ
)2
Kt (3.42)
The representative capital producing firm solves the following problem:
V ct = max
It
QtΦ
(
It
Kt
)
Kt − It − (Q¯t −Qt)Kt(1− δ) (3.43)
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The first order conditions yield an expression for the price of capital Qt:
Qt =
1
φk
(
It
Kt
− δ
) (3.44)
In equilibrium, the price of capital (i.e. the asset price in this economy), will
be equal to the marginal cost of capital production i.e., Qt = Q¯t. The law of
motion of the aggregate stock of capital is then given by:
Kt+1 = Φ
( It
Kt
)
Kt + (1− δ)Kt (3.45)
3.2.5 Retailers
There is a continuum of mass one of retailers, indexed by z ∈ [0, 1]. Each
retailer buys one unit of the homogeneous good produced by entrepreneurs
at the relative price 1
Xt
=
Pwt
Pt
, where
Pwt
Pt
is the price of intermediate goods
in terms of the final good, and transforms into a unit of a final-differentiated
good. A final usable good, Y ft , is obtained by aggregating individual retail
goods according to the following CES function:
Y ft =
[ ∫ 1
0
Yt(z)
(−1)
 dz
] 
−1
where  > 1. The demand, Yt(z) that each retailer faces is then:
Yt(z) =
(Pt(z)
Pt
)−
Y ft , (3.46)
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where Pt(z) is the sale price chosen by each retailer and Pt is the economy-wide
price index, Pt =
[ ∫ 1
0
Pt(z)
(1−)dz
] 1
(1−)
Retailers operate in a monopolistically competitive market and they are
subject to Calvo-type nominal rigidities i.e., there is a constant probability
(1− θ) according to which they can reset their price in each period.
The z-th retailer’s objective is to maximize the present discounted value of
its lifetime profits,
V rt =
∞∑
k=0
θkEt−1
[
Λt,t+k
P ∗t − Pwt+k
Pt+k
Y ∗t+k(z)
]
, (3.47)
subject to the demand schedule 3.46. I dropped the index z since each re-
optimizing retailer will face the same market conditions and, therefore, choose
the same price, P ∗t (z) = P
∗
t .
The first order condition with respect to P ∗t is the following:
∞∑
k=0
θkEt−1
{
Λt,t+k
( P ∗t
Pt+k
)−
Y ∗t+k(z)
[
P ∗t
Pt+k
−
( 
− 1
)Pwt+k
Pt+k
]}
= 0 (3.48)
Solving for the optimal price gives:
P ∗t
Pt
=

− 1
Et
∑∞
k=0 θ
kΛt,t+k
Pwt+k
Pt+k
(
Pt+k
Pt
)−
Yt+k
Et
∑∞
k=0 θ
kΛt,t+k
(
Pt+k
Pt
)−1
Yt+k
(3.49)
The price index, Pt evolves as follows:
Pt =
[
θP 1−t−1 + (1− θ)(P ∗t )1−
] 1
1−
(3.50)
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Log-linearizing of equations 3.50 and 3.51 gives the standard New-Keynesian
Phillips curve.
3.2.6 Households
The representative household chooses consumption, Ct, labor supply, Ht, sav-
ings Dt+1, and banks’ share holdings, st+1, in order to maximize its expected
discounted lifetime utility:
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
C1−σt
1− σ − γ
H1+φt
1 + φ
]
, σ , φ ≥ 0 (3.51)
where Ht is the total supply of labor, φ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply, and σ is the constant relative risk aversion coefficient.
Households have access to one-period deposits that yield the risk-free nom-
inal interest rate Rnt . They also buy banks’ equity shares, st, at a real price
p˜t per share. Moreover, they receive labor income Wtlt, where Wt is the nom-
inal wage, and they pay lump-sum taxes Tt. The budget constraint of the
representative household is:
Ct +Dt+1 + p˜tst+1 +
Tt
Pt
≤ wtHt +RtDt +
[divt
st
+ p˜t
]
st (3.52)
The first order conditions of the households problem are summarized below:
C−σt = EtβC−σt+1Rt+1 (3.53)
C−σt = EtβC−σt+1
[ divt+1
st+1
+ p˜t+1
p˜t
]
(3.54)
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γHφt = C
−σ
t wt (3.55)
3.2.7 Monetary policy
In order to compare my results to those in BGG, I assume the central bank
chooses the nominal interest rate, Rnt , according to the following policy rule:
log(Rnt )− log(Rn) = ρr(log(Rnt−1)− log(R)) + ρpipit−1 + rnt (3.56)
where the parameter ρr captures the degree of interest rate smoothing. Lat-
ter, in the crisis experiment, I will assume that the central bank follows a
conventional Taylor rule that targets current inflation:
log(Rnt )− log(R) = ρpipit + rnt , (3.57)
where ρpi > 1 and 
rn
t denotes an i.i.d. monetary policy shock.
3.3 Quantitative analysis
In this section, I examine the model’s response to a negative TFP shock and
a contractionary monetary shock. To pursue this, I parametrize the model
following the baseline calibration of BGG. I set the risk aversion parameter as
σ = 1, so that the utility is logarithmic in consumption, the discount factor
as β = 0.99, and the elasticity of labor to 3 (η = 1/3). Monitoring costs are
µ = 0.12, and the death rate of entrepreneurs is (1−γ) = 0.0272, yielding a 3%
annualized business failure rate. Moreover, the variance of the idiosyncratic
shock is set equal to 0.28.
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In the production function, the share of capital is α = 0.35 and the weight
of household labor relative to entrepreneurial labor is Ω = 0.99. The quarterly
depreciation rate is set to δ = 0.025 and investment adjustment costs are
φk = 10 in order to generate a 0.25 elasticity of the price of capital with respect
to the investment ratio. Furthermore, I assume that only 25% of retailers can
reset their prices in each period, so that θ = 0.75.
For what concerns the banking sector, I set ξ = 0.08. Given that the lever-
age constraint in my model is the equivalence of the bank capital constraint,
through the combination of equations 3.1-3.3, I follow the literature in Basel I
bank capital requirements and consider that ξ is the policy parameter. More-
over, I follow Aliaga-Dı´az, and Olivero (2010) and set the corporate tax rate
τ = 15%.
When comparing the impulse responses of the benchmark economy with
BGG, I consider the monetary policy rule 3.56 followed with ρr = 0.9 and
ρpi = 0.11. In the crisis experiment along the lines of Gertler and Karadi
(2011), I consider the conventional Taylor rule and adopt their calibration,
namely that ρr = 0 and ρpi = 1.5. Finally, both ρa and ρg are set equal to
0.90.
To better highlight the role played by the leverage constraint, I compare
the results with those from the standard BGG model. This analysis is crucial
to understand the model dynamics for the crisis experiment analyzed in the
following section, along the lines of Gertler and Karadi (2011), and Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2012). It also helps to build some intuition for the different channels
through which the two unconventional policies affect the model’s performance.
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Figure 14 plots the impulse responses of the main variables for both my
model (solid lines) and the BGG model (dotted lines). Clearly, the presence
of frictions in the banking sector amplifies all responses.
In particular, after a 1% negative shock to TFP, output in the BGG model
falls by 1%, whereas in my model economy it falls by 3%. This is due to the
amplified effect on the response of investment. In the BGG model economy,
investment fall by only 5% whereas in my model economy they fall by 15%.
It will become obvious later that this decrease in investment is not only due
to the initial decrease in entrepreneurial profits, which increases the agency
costs, but also to the deterioration of the banks’ balance sheets leading to an
even larger increase in the external finance premium. This result suggests that
all other variables will respond by the same amplified pattern. Following this
decrease in the demand for investment, asset prices fall by 4% more in my
model economy in comparison to BGG. As a result, net worth falls by 10%.
The resulted increase of entrepreneurial leverage increases the external finance
premium in my model economy by more than in the BGG case.
These results are rather interesting, since theoretical studies that isolate
the financial accelerator effect resulting from frictions in the supply side of
credit provide evidence only for a small amplification in the responses of the
main variables. The results suggest that the interaction between the frictions
in the supply side and the demand side of credit by themselves amplify the
role of the accelerator.
The cause of this becomes clear as soon as one focuses on those two channels
that are present in the model. More precisely, after the negative TFP shock,
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the demand for credit falls, causing a decrease in asset prices. This reduces the
net worth of entrepreneurs and as a result increases leverage. Propositions 1
and 2 suggest that a higher leverage is associated to a higher external finance
premium. However, a higher premium results in even further decrease in
investment and deterioration of entrepreneurs net worth. This is the standard
financial accelerator effect.
In addition to this, the negative TFP shock reduces the supply of credit.
This is due to the fact that after the negative shock, banks’ profits and, as
a result, banks’ net worth decrease, leading to a higher leverage. Under a
binding leverage constraint, banks are forced to decrease the supply of credit.
This will increase the promised payoff on loans, and therefore lead to an even
larger deterioration of entrepreneurial net worth. As Proposition 2 suggest,
this will yield an even higher increase in the external finance premium, over
and above the one caused by the decrease in the demand for credit.
Figure 15 compares the two models when there is a positive shock to the
policy interest rate. Once again, the dotted lines correspond to the BGG model
economy. The main general message is unchanged: following an adverse shock,
the responses of the main variables are all amplified.
After a 0.25% increase in the policy rate, output falls by 1.5% in contrast
to a 0.5% drop in the BGG benchmark. This is due to the amplified response
of investment, asset prices, and entrepreneurial net worth, as was the case with
the TFP shock.
72
3.4 Crisis simulation
In this section, I reconsider a crisis experiment similar to the one proposed
by Gertler and Karadi (2011) to assess the effectiveness of two unconventional
credit policies namely, equity injections to the banking sector and direct gov-
ernment lending to firms. In this case, I introduce a negative shock the to
quality of the physical capital used by entrepreneurs for production purposes,
which in turn implies a deterioration to the quality of intermediary assets. This
experiment is an attempt to capture how an aggregate distortion in banks’ as-
sets can produce the enhanced deterioration of banks’ net worth and result in
larger effects on the spreads and the credit market. Similarly to Gertler and
Karadi (2011), I assume that the central bank sets the policy rate following a
standard Taylor rule such that the central bank targets only current inflation
without an interest rate smoothing component.
It will become clear shortly that, due to the different transmission channels,
the results under the two policies are rather different. As a matter of fact, by
focusing only on frictions originating from the supply-side Gertler and Karadi
(2011), and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2012) conclude that those two policies have
similar effects on the economy.
To better evaluate their effects, I first study the model economy’s response
to negative shock to the quality of capital without those policies. As in Gertler
and Karadi (2011) I consider a five percent decline in capital quality.
As Figure 16 shows, the deterioration in capital quality, generates a sharp
recession, with output decreasing by approximately 15%. This decrease in
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output is more severe than the one obtained by Gertler and Karadi (2010),
where credit frictions operate only on the supply-side of credit. 7
After the shock, banks respond to the balance sheet’s deterioration by
reducing the available credit to meet the leverage constraint. Associated with
this is the persistent increase in the external finance premium. It takes almost
five years before the premium returns to its pre-crisis level.
The main message from these results is that banks’ leverage constraint
plays an important role in the propagation of aggregate shocks, especially
during times when it becomes binding. To better illustrate this channel, I
construct Figure 17 which shows the on-impact response of output to an ad-
verse shock to the capital quality for small increments in ξ. Let’s consider two
extreme cases. We can see that for ξ = 2% the decrease in output is approxi-
mately 11%, while for ξ = 8%, output declines approximately 14%. Figure 18
depicts the positive relationship between ξ and the premium. The latter goes
from 2.8% to 4.8% when ξ goes from 2% to 8%.
Next, I study how the economy responds to the same adverse shock under
both unconventional credit policies.
3.4.1 Equity injection
In this section, I consider the case where, in response to a crisis, the govern-
ment authority becomes shareholders of banks. In particular, I assume the
government injects equity into banks for an amount equal to a fraction ψt of
7This suggests that even a smaller shock in the quality of capital can cause a severe crisis,
resulting from the strong interaction between banks’ balance sheets and firms’ leverage.
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total available credit:
NGt+1 = ψtBt+1 (3.58)
where ψt is determined by the following policy rule:
ψt = ψ
[
Et(Rkt+1 −Rt+1)− (Rk −R)
]
(3.59)
Namely, the equity injection increases when credit spreads increase relative to
their steady state level.
Under this policy, total bank equity, NBt+1, is given by the sum of private
,Npt , and public, N
B
t equity:
Nt+1 = N
p
t+1 +N
G
t+1 (3.60)
The new balance sheet is:
Bt+1 = Dt+1 +N
p
t+1 +N
G
t+1 (3.61)
Under this policy, the new set of first order conditions for the banks problem
is the following:
EtΛt,t+1
{
[RBt+1(1− τ) + 1]
}
= (1− ψt)− ςt(1− ξ) (3.62)
EtΛt,t+1
{
[Rt+1(1− τ) + 1]
}
= 1− ςt (3.63)
µt
[
(1− ξ)Bt+1 −Dt+1
]
= 0 (3.64)
75
From the banks’ Euler condition it becomes clear that this policy targets
directly the premium on loans that banks demand since it alleviates the bind-
ingness of the bank capital constraint:
Et
{
Λt,t+1[R
B
t+1 −Rt+1]
}
=
ξςt − ψt
(1− τ) (3.65)
Figure 19 shows how the economy responds to a negative 5% shock to
the quality of capital under the equity injection policy. The figure compares
the economy’s response in the presence of the unconventional credit policy
and without it. The general message is that such credit policy significantly
moderates a recession.
In particular, after the capital quality shock, output in the economy with
equity injection falls only by 4%, whereas in the model without the credit
policy it falls by 13%. This follows from the fact that equity injections im-
mediately affect the banks’ balance sheets, increasing their net worth and
alleviating the bindingness of the bank capital constraint. This has a direct
effect on the premium, which in the case with the credit policy, increases much
less than in the case without. This shows that even when the main reason of
the frictions in the lenders side is not their proclivity to “steal”, along the lines
of Cole (2011), the credit policies significantly mitigate the recession.
This policy aims to target the credit frictions that are generated from the
presence of binding leverage constraint. Since the previous section has shown
that there is an important amplification effect generated by the presence of
credit frictions in the banking sector, the equity injections are able to immedi-
ately affect the premium and the borrowing costs of an entrepreneur. This is
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reflected by the mitigation of the negative effect of the shock on entrepreneurial
net worth and on investment and asset prices.
3.4.2 Direct lending
In this section, I consider the case of direct lending to entrepreneurs by the
government. In this scenario, the policy directly affects an entrepreneur’s
ability to borrow and finance investment spending in the following way:
QtKt+1 −Nt+1 = Bpt+1 +BGt+1 (3.66)
where BGt+1 is the amount of credit intermediated by the government and is a
fraction ψt of total credit. The policy rate ψt follows the same feedback rule
discussed in the previous section. It can be easily verified that the incentive
compatibility constraint in the contract problem is affected in the following
way:
EtΛt,t+1
[
Γ(ω¯t+1)−µG(ω¯t+1)
]
Rkt+1κt = Et
[
Λt,t+1Rt+1+
ξςt
(1− τ)
]
(κt−1−ψt(κt−1))
Figure 20 displays the responses of some key variables. As before, I compare
the responses with and without the credit policy.
Under direct lending, output falls only by 5% whereas in the case without
it it falls by 13%. Once again the main reason for the mitigated response
of output is because the credit policy affects negatively the external finance
premium.
However, the initial channel through which this policy is transmitted is
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slightly different from before. In particular, in this case there is a direct in-
crease in the total supply of loans without affecting directly the bindingness of
banks’ capital constraint. The two policies may seem to mitigate the responses
of output, but they do so in a very different way.
3.4.3 Comparison of the credit policies
Figure 21 compares the results under the two policies. It is shown that output
decreases by one percentage point less in the presence of equity injections
(and it recovers faster) with respect to the case of direct lending. This is due
to the fact that equity injection targets directly the bindingness of the bank
leverage constraint. Thus, the effect of the shadow value of the bank capital
requirement constraint on the external finance premium is mitigated. On the
other hand, it seems that direct lending immediately increases the availability
of credit to entrepreneurs, which mitigates the decrease of output, but since
the decrease on borrowing costs is not immediate, the premium in this case
takes more time to return to steady state. This is due to the fact that both
banks’ and entrepreneurs’ leverage raise he external finance premium
These results have potentially significant implications for policy analysis.
They show that even in a model without asset heterogeneity, but with frictions
both on the demand and the supply side of credit market, these two credit
policies can have different effects.
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3.5 Conclusion
I have studied in this paper the stabilizing effects of the to types of uncon-
ventional credit policies seen during the recent crisis in the context of a New
Keynesian - DSGE model with frictions on both the demand side and the sup-
ply side of credit. I have shown that the interaction of both frictions makes
credit spreads sensitive to the leverage of both financial and non-financial firms,
leading to an amplified response of the real economy to aggregate shocks.
Through this analysis I have found that in times of financial distress, when
the spread is highly sensitive to banks’ leverage, a credit policy that directly
affects the banks’ capital position increases the ability of the government to
stimulate the economy. On the other hand, a policy that increases the supply
of total credit to firms (direct lending), leads to a higher sensitivity of output to
adverse shocks and slower recovery of the economy to the long-run equilibrium.
This paper opens the discussion of why different unconventional policies
were implemented, and what the costs and benefits were of doing so. The
framework I provide here, allows researchers to further address these issues.
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Appendix A: BGG contract
In the BGG the problem of entrepreneurs is:
max
κt,ω¯t+1
Et
[
1− Γ(ω¯t+1)
]
Rkt+1κt (A.67)
subject to: [
Γ(ω¯t+1)− µΓ(ω¯t+1)
]
Rkt+1κt = Rt+1(κt − 1) (A.68)
The associated first order conditions with respect to ω¯t+1, κt and the
shadow value of the constraint, λt, respectively:
− Γ′(ω¯t+1)Rkt+1κt + λt+1
[
Γ′(ω¯t+1)− µG′(ω¯t+1)
]
Rkt+1κt = 0 (A.69)
Et
{[
1− Γ(ω¯t+1)
]
Rkt+1
}
+ Etλt+1
{[
Γ(ω¯t+1)− µG(ω¯t+1)
]
Rkt+1 −Rt+1
}
= 0
(A.70)[
Γ(ω¯t+1)− µG(ω¯t+1)
]
Rt+1κt = Rt+1(κt − 1) (A.71)
The solution to this problem gives:
Et
{[
1− Γ(ω¯t+1)
]
Rkt+1
}
κt = Et
{
Γ′(ω¯t+1)
[Γ′(ω¯t+1)− µG′(ω¯t+1)]
}
Rt+1 (A.72)
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Given the above problem the linearized premium is:
EtRˆkt+1 − Rˆt+1 = νκκˆt (A.73)
where
νκ =
1
(κ−1)
g
g′ω¯
(
f ′′ω¯
f ′ − g
′′ω¯
g′
)
1 + g
f
f ′
g′ +
g
g′ω¯
(
f ′′ω¯
f ′ − g
′′ω¯
g′
) (A.74)
where I have used the following notation:
f(ω¯t+1) ≡
[
1− Γ(ω¯t+1)
]
(A.75)
and
g(ω¯t+1) ≡
[
Γ(ω¯t+1)− µG(ω¯t+1
]
(A.76)
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Appendix B: The contract in the main model
In the main model studied in this paper, the problem of entrepreneurs is:
max
κt,ω¯t+1
Et
{[
1− Γ(ω¯t+1)
]
Rkt+1
}
κt (B.77)
subject to:
Et
{
Λt+1
[
Γ(ω¯t+1)− µG(ω¯t+1)
]
Rkt+1κt
}
= Et
{
Λt+1
[
Rt+1 +
ξςt
(1− τ)
]}
(κt − 1)
(B.78)
The associated first order conditions with respect to ω¯t+1, κt and the
shadow value of the constraint, λt, respectively:
− Γ′(ω¯t+1)Rkt+1κt + λtΛt+1
[
Γ′(ω¯t+1)− µG′(ω¯t+1)
]
Rkt+1κt = 0 (B.79)
Et
[
1−Γ(ω¯t+1)
]
Rkt+1+λt
[
Et
{
Λt+1
[
Γ(ω¯t+1)−µG(ω¯t+1)
]
Rkt+1
}
−Et
{
Λt+1
[
Rt+1+
ξςt
(1− τ)
]}]
= 0
Et
{
Λt+1
[
Γ(ω¯t+1)− µG(ω¯t+1)
]
Rkt+1
}
κt = Et
{
Λt+1
[
Rt+1 +
ξςt
(1− τ)
]}
(κt − 1)
(B.80)
The solution to this problem is:
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Et
{[
1−Γ(ω¯t+1)
]
Rkt+1
}
κt =
Γ′(ω¯t+1)
[Γ′(ω¯t+1)− µG′(ω¯t+1)]Et
{
Λt,t+1
[
Rt+1+
ξςt
(1− τ)
]}
(B.81)
Given the above solution the log-linearized premium is given by:
EtRˆkt+1 − EtRˆBt+1 = νκκˆt (B.82)
EtRˆBt+1 − νREtRˆt+1 = νς ςˆt − νΛEtΛˆt,t+1 (B.83)
where νR =
R
RB
, and νς =
R
RB
ξς
(1−τ) , and νΛ = 1− RRB .
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Appendix C: Steady state
• From the intermediate good’s market clearing condition we have:
y = hψ(A∗) (C.84)
so the MPL = ∂y
∂l
= hlψ(A
∗) + hψA∗A∗l
• from the labor supply we have
lθcσ = (1− τ d)w (C.85)
• from the labor demand we have:
qhl =
Rfw
Φ(A∗)
(C.86)
since q = mc = η−1
η
we find the wage as:
w =
η − 1
η
hl
Φ(A∗)
Rf
(C.87)
plugging the above equation into the labor supply we get:
lθcσ = (1− τ d)η − 1
η
hl
Φ(A∗)
Rf
(C.88)
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by the equality of the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal prod-
uct of labor we get:
(1− τ d) = η
η − 1
Rf
γ(A∗)
[slψ(A∗)− sν
a1
µA∗] (C.89)
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Figures
Figure 1: IRFs when the spread = BP-TB.
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Figure 2: Multiplier.
Figure 3: Cumulative responses.
94
Figure 4: IRFs when the spread=nim.
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Figure 5: IRFs when the spread=Baa-TB.
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Figure 6: IRFs when government investment is ordered first.
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Figure 7: IRFs when government consumption is ordered first.
98
Figure 8: IRFs when v = 0.01 in the case of a balanced budget with lump sum
taxes. Model 1 is the benchmark model, model 2 is the model without agency
costs and model 3 is a simple NK model.
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Figure 9: IRFs when v = 0.01 in the case of a balanced budget with lump sum
taxes. Model 1 is the benchmark model, model 2 is the model without agency
costs and model 3 is a simple NK model..
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Figure 10: IRFs when v=0.01 in the case of a balanced budget with distor-
tionary taxes. Model 1 is the benchmark model, model 2 is the model without
agency costs and model 3 is a simple NK model.
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Figure 11: IRFs when v=0.01 in the case of a balanced budget with distor-
tionary taxes. Model 1 is the benchmark model, model 2 is the model without
agency costs and model 3 is a simple NK model.
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Figure 12: IRFs when v=0.01 in the case of debt-financing. Model 1 is the
benchmark model, model 2 is the model without agency costs and model 3 is
a simple NK model.
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Figure 13: IRFs when v=0.01 in the case of debt-financing. Model 1 is the
benchmark model, model 2 is the model without agency costs and model 3 is
a simple NK model.
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Figure 14: IRFs of the model economy and BGG model to a negative one
percent TFP shock.
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Figure 15: IRFs of the model economy and BGG model to a 0.25 percent
shock on the policy interest rate.
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Figure 16: IRFs of the model economy to a 5 percent decrease in the quality
of capital.
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Figure 17: Sensitivity of output to changes in in the model economy.
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Figure 18: Sensitivity of the premium to changes in in the model economy.
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Figure 19: IRFs of the model economy to a five percent decrease in the capital
quality with and without equity injections.
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Figure 20: IRFs of the model economy to a five percent decrease in the capital
quality with and without direct lending.
111
Figure 21: Comparison of the IRFs of the model economy under the two credit
policies after a five percent decrease in the capital quality.
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